Liu Deng, Chen Su, Xu Tan (with Rao Li forwarded), Chen Xie [1], also informing Peng Xi, Zhu Liu (with Nie Xiao forwarded), Yang Luo Yang, and Lin Luo [2]: Under the present circumstances, both annihilation of the enemy and delivering annihilation-level blows to the enemy must be given equal attention.


To annihilate the enemy means to wipe out entire brigades or divisions clean, leaving no survivors.
To implement this policy, we must concentrate three or four times the enemy’s strength; one part should strike the enemy’s front, another should envelop its flanks, while the main force or a key component should outflank the enemy’s rear—effectively encircling the enemy on all sides. Only in this way can success be achieved.
This is our army’s basic policy, and it is the correct approach that must be followed when the enemy forces are dispersed and isolated, and when reinforcements cannot arrive quickly.


However, when the enemy advances toward us along several routes that are not far apart, or when it establishes defensive lines across our line of advance with multiple columns similarly spaced, our forces should adopt the policy of delivering annihilation-level blows to the enemy.
That is to say, instead of encircling the enemy on all sides, we should confine ourselves to two- or three-sided encirclements, concentrating our full strength against the enemy’s front and one or both flanks. The objective would not be to completely destroy the enemy, but rather to annihilate a portion of its forces and rout another.
By doing so, we can reduce our own casualties. The units that are destroyed can be absorbed into our ranks, while those that are routed will scatter en masse, leaving only a small fraction able to regroup, which will struggle to regain combat effectiveness in the short term.


At present, Gu Zhutong’s [3] command still commands thirty-two to thirty-five strategically mobile field brigades, deployed across Jiaodong, southwestern Shandong, western Anhui, and Henan. If we can selectively apply the two methods described above according to the situation and, within a short period, inflict annihilation and annihilation-level blows upon ten to fifteen of these mobile brigades, the overall strategic situation could change rapidly.


Please consider and implement accordingly.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript by the Military Commission without abridgment.


Notes [1] Liu Deng refers to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who at the time served as commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army.
Chen Su refers to Chen Yi and Su Yu, who at the time were commander and political commissar, and deputy commander, respectively, of the East China Field Army.
Xu Tan refers to Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin, who at the time were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Eastern Corps of the East China Field Army.
Rao Li refers to Rao Shushi and Li Yu, who at the time were political commissar and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Military Region.
Chen Xie refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who at the time were secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the Chen-Xie Group of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army.
[2] Peng Xi refers to Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun, who at the time were commander and political commissar, and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army.
Zhu Liu refers to Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi.
Nie Xiao refers to Nie Rongzhen and Xiao Ke, who at the time were commander and political commissar, and deputy commander, respectively, of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region.
Yang Luo Yang refers to Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu, who at the time were commander, first political commissar, and second political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army.
Lin Luo refers to Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan, who at the time were commander-in-chief and political commissar, and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic United Army.
[3] Gu Zhutong was then commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army’s General Headquarters. In early March 1947, he established the Xuzhou Command under the General Headquarters in Xuzhou, assuming unified command over the troops formerly under the Xuzhou and Zhengzhou Pacification Offices.