Our Army’s Countermeasures to Chiang
Kaishek’s Plan to Draw Troops from Eastern
Jiaozhou
 (August 25, 1947, 3:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.)
To Rao [Shushi] and Li [Yu], and for the information of Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu],
Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1
We received your telegram of 9:00 to 11:00 P.M. on the 24th. It seems that
Chiang Kaishek has determined that our main forces are bound to defend eastern
Jiaozhou, so he plans to send four or five divisions to launch an attack on eastern
Jiaozhou so as to draw our main forces to the internal lines, then to build solid
fortifications along the Qingdao-Pingdu-Yexian line and to block it off, defend
that line with approximately two divisions, and then to launch an attack toward
the east with three or four divisions. He appears to hope that this plan will be realized quickly so he can draw out two or three divisions to use elsewhere. At present, he is using twenty brigades in the area north of Linyi, which is more or less
equivalent to the troop strength he used at the Dabie Mountains to deal with Liu
and Deng, but in dealing with Chen and Su in southwestern Shandong, his troop
strength has been very weak. In dealing with Peng and Xi2 in northern Shaanxi,
he has found his troop strength to be very inadequate, since the Thirty-sixth
Division was annihilated (there are now only seven reserve brigades), and he has
no troops at all to deal with Chen Geng’s forces3 in western Henan. Under these
circumstances, Chiang Kaishek must quickly make efforts to finish up the fighting in eastern Jiaozhou so he can transfer forces. We therefore completely agree
that you place one unit on internal lines and place the main force (the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth columns) on external lines, which is consistent with the overall guiding principle of persisting over a long period of time. If Xu [Shiyou] and
Tan [Zhenlin]4 lead three columns into position on the external lines (in the area
around Zhucheng) and seek an opportunity to win one or two small battles (not
fighting battles in which victory is not assured), then the enemy will not dare to
penetrate eastern Jiaozhou, and most, or at least part, of eastern Jiaozhou can be
preserved intact.
Mao Zedong

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Notes

The source of our text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 210–11, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

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1.  Rao Shushi and Li Yu were political commissar and deputy political commissar,
respectively, of the East China Military Region. Chen Yi was commander and political
commissar of the East China Field Army, and Su Yu was deputy commander of the East
China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

2.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army
and Xi Zhongxun was deputy political commissar of the Northwest Field Army.

3.  Chen Geng was secretary of the Chen-Xie Group Front Committee of the Jin-Ji-LuYu Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-26

4.  Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively,
of the Eastern Corps of the East China Field Army.