The Western Corps Should Actively Support
Liu and Deng in Combat with Coordinated
Action
(August 24, 1947)
To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng
[Xiaoping] and the East China Bureau:1
Comrade Su Yu’s opinions contained in the telegram of 7:00 P.M. on the 18th2
are absolutely correct. The scope of fighting for the Western Corps3 is set as the
area south of the Yellow River, north of the Huai River, west of the Grand Canal,
and east of the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway. You are expected to pass this information on to [Chen] Shiju and Tang [Liang], Ye [Fei] and Tao [Yong],4 and to the
Sixth and Tenth columns and the artillery column, and to have them carry it out
resolutely. Except for the Sixth, Tenth, and the artillery columns, which are undergoing rest and reorganization at Liaocheng and Zhangqiuzhen and are to prepare
to quickly move south, please order Chen, Tang, Ye, and Tao to act in accordance
with the telegrams from Liu and Deng at 7:00 to 9:00 A.M. on the 20th and 3:00
to 5:00 P.M. on the 21st, and attack and occupy the various weakly defended
county towns in southwestern Shandong, and also to launch a massive attack on
the [Kaifeng]-Xu[zhou] railway.5 The second step is to prepare for operations in the area south of the railway, and it is necessary to take active measures to coordinate support for Liu and Deng in battle. Right now, there are already approximately twenty brigades of the enemy’s forces advancing in the direction of Liu
and Deng’s front, but southwestern Shandong and the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu border area are rather weakly defended. In September and October, you must wipe
out several sections of the enemy’s forces, attack and occupy most of the weakly
defended cities and towns, and gradually make these two areas into a favorable
battlefield as well as support the Liu and Deng’s rear area. If the Western Corps
is unable to achieve these aims in September and October, and Liu and Deng are
thus unable to hold their ground in the Dabie Mountains, or if they even suffer
losses and are forced to withdraw northward, this would be harmful to the overall
situation. It is quite possible to engage in battle with approximately 5,000 men per
brigade, so there should not be any constant worries about reinforcements, and
what should be promoted is a spirit of not fearing sacrifice or hardship, persevering in fighting continuous battles, and fighting fiercely. After a major campaign
(including several battles), the period of rest and reorganization should also not
be too long. Ten days to two weeks should be enough, and a whole month of rest
and reorganization should occur only once or twice a year because the situation
with the enemy does not allow us to take long periods of rest and reorganization.
The Northwest Field Army under Deputy Commander Peng [Dehuai]6 originally
had only six brigades, but two brigades were added this month from northwestern Shanxi. Each of these brigades has from 3,000 to 5,000 men at most, adding
up to no more than 34,000 men, including two local brigades with a very weak
fighting capacity. In more than five months of fighting (beginning on March 19),
they have not been reinforced with new recruits from the Liberated Areas and
they have only been reinforced with captured soldiers, yet they have wiped out
approximately eight enemy brigades, fought continuous battles, and took only
five or at most ten days to rest after each battle. Now, however, they not only
have increased somewhat in number from before the battles but also their fighting
capacity has been strengthened. In the first year of fighting, our East China Army
has already shown itself to be the army with the most battle successes throughout the country. It suffered more losses in July, but this did not affect the overall
situation. You are expected to get to southwestern Shandong as soon as possible,
exert unified command over all columns of the Western Corps, and coordinate
with the local forces in each locality so as to complete the glorious task that the
Central Committee has assigned to our East China Army. I believe you will certainly be able to fulfill this task. In order that the task be carried out resolutely
and forcefully, it is essential for all army units, from top to bottom (all officers
and men), to understand their own tasks clearly. Because the Western Corps set
out in haste this time, the new tasks for engaging in battle in the areas west of the
Grand Canal, north of the Huai River, south of the Yellow River, and east of the
[Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway have yet to be transmitted in full. You are expected
to order the commanders of all columns to transmit this information rapidly and to
order cadres at all levels to study the geographic conditions (provide one clear and
simple map to each person at or above the level of battalion commander) and the
conditions of the people and the enemy to facilitate the waging of war. The basic
task for the second year of fighting is to draw the war into the Guomindang areas,
and some of the tasks include wiping out the enemy from the internal lines in
order to ruin the Guomindang’s plan (which is to draw the war into the Liberated
Areas, destroy the Liberated Areas, and prevent the Liberated Areas from lasting for a long time), reaching our goal of dispersing the enemy and defeating the
enemy one by one as well as keeping the Liberated Areas from being destroyed
and keeping the war going on for a long period of time. It is also necessary that
cadres at all levels be made to understand this overall strategy completely and
clearly. You are urgently requested to transmit this telegram to the comrades of all
columns and brigades in the Western Corps and the Eastern Corps.7 Has Comrade
Chen Yi returned from Bohai to his unit yet? When can you reach Liaocheng?
Mao Zedong

---

Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 207–9, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army,
and Su Yu was deputy commander of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng
Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu
(Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Su Yu advised expanding the battle area of the four brigades of
the East China Field Army south of the Longhai railway as well as sabotaging the Tianjin-Pukou railway and threatening Xuzhou.

3.  The Western Corps was composed of the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Tenth columns and the Special Forces Column. It also referred to the Eleventh Column of
the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.

4.  Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff and Tang Liang was director of the Political Department of the East China Field Army. Ye Fei was commander of the First Column of the East
China Field Army, and Tao Yong was commander of the Fourth Column of the East China
Field Army.

5.  This is a segment of the Longhai railway.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-25

6.  Peng Dehuai was deputy commander-in-chief of the PLA as well as commander and
political commissar of the Northwest Field Army.

7.  The Eastern Corps was composed of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth columns and
the Thirteenth Column, which was just being organized.