Three Opinions Regarding Our Army’s
Southward Advance
(August 12, 1947)
To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Chen [Yi] and
Su [Yu]:1
There are three points we would like you to mull over:
	 1.	 Thinking back to the 25,000-li Long March period, we rested too little, were
too exhausted, and lost too many personnel. Moreover, much of the urgency
was unnecessary. As our army marches south this time, we must reduce
unnecessary urgency and strive to walk less and rest more. When the situation is tense, we should march a few days longer, but we should follow this
with a few days of rest to recover from fatigue.
	 2.	 During the next few weeks you must avoid fighting any large battles, and you
should focus on attacking weak and dispersed enemy forces. Do not attack
strong, concentrated enemy forces. Do not consider fighting any large battles
until our army becomes accustomed to operating on the exterior line without
a rear base, builds up its strength and energy, and enjoys favorable conditions in terms of the enemy’s situation and the topography.
	 3.	 Do not expect to be able to establish and consolidate base areas in the Dabie
Mountains, western Henan, western Anhui, and other places in the short
term; this is impossible. These only can be temporary footholds. You must
anticipate that there will be a very long period (at least half a year) during which our forces will move back and forth among the eastern, western,
southern, and northern areas between the rivers to propagandize and mobilize the masses. Only after we eliminate dozens of enemy brigades will we
be able to establish and consolidate the base areas.
Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 193–94, where it is
	 4.	 If Liu and Deng think the above three points are practical, then please tell
Chen [Shiju], Tang [Liang], Ye [Fei], and Tao [Yong]2 to carry them out
together so everyone will be psychologically prepared to vanquish Chiang
Kaishek.
The Military Commission
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission to
Liu Bocheng and to Deng Xiaoping, commander and political commissar, respectively, of
the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Yi was commander
and political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Su Yu was deputy commander
of the East China Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-21

2.  Chen Shiju and Tang Liang were chief-of-staff and director of the Political Department, respectively, of the East China Field Army. Ye Fei and Tao Yong were commanders of
the First and Fourth columns, respectively, of the East China Field Army.