Estimation of the Enemy’s Countermeasures
after Liu and Deng Set Out
(August 6, 1947)
To Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], Chen
[Geng], and Xie [Fuzhi]:1
What do you estimate the enemy’s countermeasures will be after you have set
out? We feel that the enemy may use two or three methods. The first method is to
organize an offensive quickly so you cannot gain a foothold. It will be difficult to
mobilize many troops with this method, however. It is estimated that about twelve
brigades (or more) will be used in the attack, i.e., two brigades each from the
Seventh Division, Forty-eighth Division, Tenth Division, Seventy-ninth Division,
Third Division, and Fifty-eighth Division. Except for the Guangxi faction, their
combat ability is not very strong. They will have different starting points and will
inevitably be in different places within a short period of time. If we can wipe out
four or five of their brigades while they are moving, their offensive will surely
suffer a setback and we will have a chance to rest, which will be advantageous for
future combat. The basic shortcoming of this method for the enemy is that their
attack forces are too few, we will have a lot of extra room to maneuver and they
will be afraid that we will cross the river to the south (the enemy is very much
afraid of this). In addition to the twelve brigades (or more) mentioned above,
they may transfer more than ten brigades from Shandong for a total of twenty or
so brigades. They will spend a month or two to complete the deployment, first
attacking from the Yangzi River and the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway, and then
attacking to the west and north. The basic drawback to this method is that it gives
us time to gain a foothold and it will completely destroy the Shandong offensive.
In addition, it will be difficult for them to keep most of western Shandong and
eastern Henan. Even if they gather more than twenty brigades and they split into
The source of our text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 283–85, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
two lines and multiple attack columns, we can still destroy them one by one as we
are moving. The third method is to use the two methods described above simultaneously, that is, not only taking about twelve brigades and dividing them up into
several columns to attack quickly but also transferring more than ten brigades
from Shandong to use in the Yangzi River area. You must prepare to deal with
all three of these methods, but you must primarily prepare to deal with the first
one. That is, focus entirely on wiping out large groups of the enemy while you are
moving because everything depends on victory. After Chen and Xie go to western
Henan, Hu Zongnan’s2 offensive in northern Shaanxi will surely be destroyed.
Except for two brigades from the Tenth Division, one brigade from the Seventyninth Division, and the First Cavalry Brigade, which have already been transferred to the east, we must also transfer at least six or seven brigades to use in the
Tongguan, Shang[zhou], and Luo[nan] areas. We estimate that within one month
it will be very difficult for the enemy to initiate a strong offensive. Moreover, after
our two columns move south, Hefei, Anqing, eastern Hebei, Hankou, the Beiping-Hankou railway, the Han River valley, and Nanyang, Tongguan, and Luoyang
all must be garrisoned, and garrisoning all these places will require dozens of
brigades. The enemy has a total of forty-five reserve brigades in Shandong, western Shandong, and northern Shaanxi (twenty-nine in Shandong, eight in western Shandong, and eight in northern Shaanxi), and there are ninety-six garrison
force brigades (including those that have been wiped out). To transfer dozens of
brigades to garrison the Yangzi River, the Han River, and the Beiping-Hankou
railway, the enemy may have to greatly reduce the garrison troops on the Longhai
railway and the areas north of it, and also turn a portion of the reserve forces into
garrison forces. If the enemy does so, it is entirely possible that the overall situation will change. Only if our forces that have moved to the south are unable to
wipe out a large number of the enemy, and therefore are unable to gain a foothold
and are forced to retreat will the enemy temporarily be mobilized, and the overall
situation will remain unchanged. In addition, we will pay the price of heavy casualties and attrition. No matter what purpose this price serves, we must be prepared
to pay it, but it will be worth paying if it changes the overall situation.
The Military Commission

--- Notes

1.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Yi was
commander, Su Yu was political commissar and deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was
deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army. Chen
Geng and Xie Fuzhi were secretary and deputy secretary, respectively, of the Front Committee of the Chen-Xie Group under the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-18


2.  Hu Zongnan was director of the Guomindang army’s Xi’an Pacification Office.