Military Deployment to Safeguard and
Expand Strategic Leverage
(July 23, 1947)
To Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, and the East
China Bureau:1
Under the present circumstances, we propose the following military deployment in order to safeguard and expand the leverage we have already begun to
secure:
	 1.	 Liu and Deng should attack and destroy the enemy at Yangshanji and Jining
if they are confident they can do so quickly. Otherwise, all troops should
immediately amass and reconsolidate for about ten days. With the exception of wiping out small enemy groups and civil corps passing by, do not
attack Longhai and the area east of the New Yellow River.2 Moreover, do not
attack the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway, and resolve to give up the rear. Take
half a month to move directly to the Dabie Mountains and occupy dozens
of counties centered around the Dabie Mountains, wipe out the civil corps,
mobilize the masses, establish a base area, and fight mobile battles after luring the enemy to attack. We have already ordered Chen Geng’s column,3
which commands more than 70,000 troops of the Taihang Brigade, the Fifth
Division,4 and the Thirty-eighth Army, to set out from western Henan in
late August, set up a base area in the E-Yu-Shaan [Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi]
Border Region, and lure one of Hu Zongnan’s units5 into mobile warfare.

	 2.	 As Chen Shiju’s troops6 were unable to leave Si[shui] and Qu[fu] and join
Ye [Fei] and Tao [Yong],7 and therefore had no choice but to leave western Shandong. The two groups of Qiu Qingquan and Wu Shaozhou8 may
quickly leave western Shandong and mobilize jointly, thereby making it
difficult for us to strike. Chen Shiju and Tang Liang should therefore use
one unit to pin down Qiu and Wu, and the main forces should act quickly
to set about to wipe out the scattered, isolated, and weak enemy forces
along the Longhai line and the area to its north. They should expand the
battlefield in this region, pin down Qiu and Wu inside the area, and take the
opportunity to attack their forces after they have scattered. Chen and Tang
should not rashly leave the area south of Longhai. If absolutely necessary,
they can temporarily send one unit or the majority to the area between
Longhai, the New Yellow River, and the Huai River as a mobile force.
Afterwards, Chen and Tang can move north and south of Longhai, and one
unit can be sent back to southern Shandong to coordinate the battle with the
main forces.
	 3.	 The two brigades under Ye and Tao should go to Fujian, Zhejiang, and
Jiangxi and establish a Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi base area. The steps to be followed are: First, rest and reconsolidate for a few days at the present location,
swiftly annihilate the enemy in the Tai’an, Dawenkou, Feicheng, Pingyin,
Dong’a, and Dongping areas, occupy the region, and take two weeks to two
months for rest, replenishment, cadre appointments, and political mobilization in this region (or in Laocheng). Second, move out to western Anhui
and establish a temporary base there. Third, take the opportunity to cross
the river to southern Anhui and establish a second temporary base there.
Fourth, reach the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi destinations. Go south with
the Guangdong Column9 under the command of Ye and Tao. Please also
consider organizing a Southeast Branch Bureau, and [Deng] Zihui, [Zhang]
Dingcheng, and Zeng Shan10 will go there to take charge of it.
	 4.	 Chen, Su, and Tan are leading the main forces in Shandong, and after Liu
and Deng have arrived at the Dabie Mountains, they should direct Chen and

Tang to assume responsibility for all fighting on the interior lines. After
going to western Henan, the Chen and Xie forces11 will be under the battle
command of Liu and Deng.
Central Military Commission

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Notes

--- Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 274–76, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

1.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Chen Yi was
commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, with Su Yu as deputy
commander and Tan Zhenlin as deputy political commissar.

2.  See Vol. IX, p. 552, ftn. 3, of this series.

3.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.

4.  Li Xiannian was commander and political commissar of the Fifth Division of the
New Fourth Army.

5.  Hu Zongnan was director of the Guomindang army’s Xi’an Pacification Office.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-11

6.  Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff of the Third, Eighth, and Tenth columns of the East
China Field Army, and Tang Liang (1919–1986) was director of its Political Department.

7.  Ye Fei was commander of the First Column of the East China Field Army. Tao Yong
was commander of the Fourth Column.

8.  Qiu Qingquan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Fifth Division (formerly the Fifth Army). Wu Shaozhou was commander of the Reorganized Eighty-fifth Division.

9.  The Guangdong Column refers to the units from Guangdong and Guangxi under the
command of the East China Field Army.

10.  Deng Zihui was deputy secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhang Dingcheng and Zeng Shan were members of
the Standing Committee of the East China Bureau.

11.  The forces under Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi included the Fourth and Ninth columns of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army, the Thirty-eighth Army of the Northwest Democratic
Allied Army, and the Twenty-second Brigade of the Taiyue Military Region. On July 27,
1947, they formally established a Group Front Committee, with Chen Geng as secretary
and Xie Fuzhi as deputy secretary.