Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party at Xiaohe
(July 21, 1947)
I.
With regard to military plans, on the Northwest battlefront the original intention
was to concentrate the two units of the Northwest Field Army and Chen Geng’s
column1 to fight Hu Zongnan,2 but it has now been decided to fight separately.
This has advantages in terms of both strategy and food supply. This year we will
only be able to weaken Hu Zongnan, but by July of next year we should be in a
position to destroy him. The Shaan[xi]-Gan[su]-Ning[xia] border area can rely
primarily on the Jin-Sui [Shanxi-Suiyuan] border area both militarily and financially, and this will be the case even more so from now on because the war has
reduced both the area and the population of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border
area. It has now been decided to appoint Comrade He Long as commander of the
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia and Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Force so as to unify
command and to deal with the three problems of unifying the rear areas, retrenching and economizing, and carrying out local work.
As for the struggle against Chiang Kaishek, the plan to spend five years finishing it off looks possible from the perspective of the achievements during the
past year. The situation in Shandong can be transformed in the near future. This
is not yet possible in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area, but basically the
enemy’s attacks have been halted, which means a foundation has been established
to change the situation later. During the past year we wiped out 1,120,000 men in
Chiang Kaishek’s regular and irregular armies, and we ourselves suffered casualties of more than 300,000 men. Assuming that the warfare during the second
and third years will be somewhat more intense, we will have to be prepared for

2,000,000 casualties over the course of the five years. At present, we have a main
force of 900,000 men, and local troops of 600,000 men. If the main force could
be increased to 1,500,000 men, this would be enough to take care of the problem.
Chiang Kaishek has become more isolated politically, which is to say that the
popular masses mistrust him more than ever and he is increasingly opposed by the
masses and has been deserted by his friends. Of course, it has not yet reached the
point where he is completely isolated, and there are still some who blindly believe
in him; there will have to be a process. In the past, during the period of War of
Resistance, our overall policy toward Chiang Kaishek and the diehards was to
isolate them. In the united front we made certain concessions while persisting
on our political independence and autonomy, carrying out reductions of rent and
interest in the base areas, and developing mass work and criticism of the diehard
elements in the Guomindang areas. We did not make the kind of mistake that the
American Communist Party made at one point,3 nor did we wait until the end of
the War of Resistance before changing our overall policy, for that would have
been too late. After Japan’s surrender, peace talks between the Guomindang and
the Communist Party were necessary. Even though the goal we had hoped for, a
political resolution of all the problems, was not reached, Chiang Kaishek was certainly further isolated. Only through a long process of educating the masses was
our Party able to raise the sixteen slogans4 for this year’s commemoration of “July
7.” As for the plan to finish the fight against Chiang Kaishek within five years, for
now we will not talk about it openly, but rather we will prepare for a protracted
struggle of five to ten years, or even fifteen years. We do not want to do as Chiang
Kaishek did, first talking about destroying the Communist Party within a few
months, then saying a few more months were needed, and now talking about the
war having just begun.
Since the end of the War of Resistance, the components of the Party’s united
front have been undergoing a change: The number of one portion of its membership has gone down, and that of another portion has gone up. What has gone down
is the number of landlords in the Liberated Areas because we are now carrying
out land reform instead of merely practicing rent and interest reduction as was the
case during the War of Resistance. The southern landlords fell out with Chiang

Kaishek over conscription of soldiers and collection of grain, but they have not
broken with us as yet. What has increased is the number of centrists. These people
trusted Chiang Kaishek more during the period of the War of Resistance, but they
have now joined us in the resistance against Chiang Kaishek. Such a situation
never occurred during the ten years of civil war. During the War of Resistance,
Huang Yanpei5 was quite happy with the New Fourth Army, but he was unable
to join us in resisting the People’s Political Council.6 Now, although he is not
happy with land reform in northern Jiangsu, he is able to join us in opposing the
fake National Assembly. Persisting in land reform is unlikely to scare away the
national bourgeoisie, while not persisting in land reform will certainly mean losing the peasants, and thereby losing the revolutionary war as well as losing the
national bourgeoisie. Land reform should adopt a policy of equal distribution of
land, in which the landlords should not be given more but neither should they be
given nothing. Land reform has to be combined with the united front. We made
“leftist” mistakes during the ten-year civil war. One was that during the agrarian revolution landlords were given no land and rich peasants were given poor
land; now we are distributing land equally to everyone. Another was the failure to
establish a united front in the cities or to unite with the national bourgeoisie; now
we are adopting a policy of overthrowing bureaucratic capital while protecting
national industry and commerce.
With regard to the international situation, Great Britain and the United States
continue to join together in an attempt to isolate the Soviet Union, and it seems
that the principle of resolving problems through international cooperation adopted
at the Tehran and Potsdam conferences7 is becoming tenuous. Although it cannot yet be said that Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union will
definitely not jointly sign a peace treaty with Germany, the possibility of signing
a peace treaty separately already exists. This modifies the analysis of the international situation at the Seventh Congress, but a final conclusion cannot be reached
at this point. The emergence of a counterrevolutionary united front of various
countries led by the American reactionaries can be confirmed, and they are intent on waging a third world war. However, the revolutionary united front of various
countries under the leadership of the Soviet Union has also developed greatly,
and this united front is going to defeat the counterrevolutionary united front. We
should not be intimidated by the first gust of wind, but rather we should analyze
the situation. The three factors mentioned in the Central Committee’s directive
of February 1 of this year8 remain unchanged—the great strength of the Soviet
Union, the progress of the people of all countries, and the economic crisis of
capitalism. This crisis will force Great Britain and the United States to engage in
trade with the Soviet Union, giving the Soviet Union opportunities for construction and giving opportunities to the Chinese Revolution and the people of the
world to strengthen their unity. The last economic crisis in international capitalism forced the United States to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. [Harry] Pollitt9 said that 1928 was the peak year of anti-communism in the
capitalist world, but the economic crisis of 1929 forced this peak downwards. The
present anti-Sovietism is limited to merely the propaganda and diplomacy arenas.
In reality, anti-communism opposes the people of the whole world. There is a
characteristic common both to the counterrevolutionaries of the various countries
and to the Chinese counterrevolutionaries, which is to be strong on the outside
but hollow on the inside. This is because they have political and economic crises.
Chiang Kaishek’s General Mobilization Order10 illustrates this point. The General
Mobilization Order actually solved a huge problem, which was to cause people
who desire peace to recognize the Guomindang’s true colors in launching the civil
war. In analyzing the situation, it is important to see that the sympathy of China’s
people, the sympathy of people all over the world, the national united front, and
the agrarian revolution are all factors that have a continuing effect, and the superiority of the Guomindang forces and their launch of sudden attacks are factors
that have only a temporary effect. The severe crisis within Chiang Kaishek’s inner
ranks and the impending crisis in the United States will ultimately lead them to
a position of being opposed by the masses and deserted by their followers. They
will be opposed by the masses in that the masses will reject them, and their followers will desert them in that there will be tensions within them. There are tensions
within Chiang Kaishek’s ranks and between Chiang and the Americans as well.
The local work is to link up with the masses, and the core of this is to resolve
the land problem. We should emulate the methods used in northwestern Shanxi,
organize poor peasant leagues, and resolutely overcome the tendency among certain cadres to favor landlords and rich peasants. The majority of cadres who have made mistakes can be reformed through education, and the minority who cannot be properly educated are to be weeded out. This can only do good and not
harm. This is a matter of principle, and we are confident that the comrades of the
Northwest Bureau will be able to carry out this task.
II.
There are two fundamental mistakes in the existing systems of finance and commerce: first, paying attention only to finance and not to the economy, only to the
minority and not to the majority, and failing to realize that if a correct orientation
is not adopted in the financial and commercial sectors, work in other domains
will be difficult to tackle. Second, failure to exert strict control externally. Strict
control must be exercised over large public commerce, small public commerce,
and trade amongst the masses. This is something that must be resolutely carried
out by any small revolutionary force when struggling against the encirclement of
a counterrevolutionary force. In sum, for a period of time from now on we should
persist in the principle of self-sufficiency, exercise external control, and focus on
both the military and the civil. Resolving this problem is fraught with difficulties,
and it must be tackled step by step.
III.
“Consider everything from a comprehensive and long-term perspective”: This is
an extremely important slogan, and it should be explained throughout the Party and
the army. Our enemies place their hopes for victory on our inability to hold out for
the long run. Our countermeasure is to shift our main forces to external lines and
to simplify administration and practice economy internally. Retrenchment and
a lowering of living standards must be carried out in every border area, starting
with the cadres. External trade must be strictly controlled, so that not only luxury
goods and other unnecessary goods are barred from being imported but also daily
necessities may be banned from being imported when they are needed and can
be produced by ourselves. China Textile Company’s fabrics are of high quality
and they are inexpensive, but we should still prohibit the import of machinery
and other raw materials so as to develop textile production in the countryside.
This is the only way to survive. Finance and trade are to serve the entire national
economy, and attention must be paid to both the military and the civilian.
IV.
As regards the land problem, our land policy during the ten-year period of civil
war had to be changed during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Otherwise, we
would not have been able to alleviate domestic conflicts and conflicts within the
base areas, build up the strength of the Chinese people, and fight Japan together.
At that time, our political authorities in the base areas carried out the “three-thirds system,” involving a united front even with the landlord class. This in no way
affected the lower levels of political power, nor did it place limitations on the
struggles of the masses. Generally speaking, at present the “three-thirds system”
remains unchanged, but it is defined as including one-third each of Communist
Party members, progressives, and centrists, but not reactionary landlords. Today
the land policy can and in fact must go a step beyond the May 4th Directive,11
because the peasant masses demand a further step, such as equal distribution of
land. Equal distribution of land is a principle, but there is room for flexibility
based on different circumstances, such as the cases of Du Bincheng and Hou
Wailu,12 although not for Communist Party members. Land should not be taken
from middle peasants, but in the high tide of the mass movement and with the permission of the middle peasants themselves, it is permissible for well-to-do middle peasants to hand over some of their land. This practice should not be put in
writing formally. After our forces have fought their way to external lines, rather
than immediately confiscating the landlords’ land, it would be better to apportion taxes according to class line. If the policy of land to the tiller is carried out
immediately, it is certain to create a situation in which the masses are forced to
comply. The Central Committee leadership should also take responsibility for the
problems that occurred in financial work in the Northwest. The leaders in the
Northwest Bureau should develop boldness of spirit, adopt a sharp and serious
attitude toward their mistakes, and strengthen their concrete leadership so as to
reach the goal of uniting with the comrades and uniting with the masses. The
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region has several advantageous conditions for uniting
with the masses and persisting in the struggle: First, there is a core of local leaders.
This applies to the whole border region, but this problem has not been resolved in
[Dingbian], [Anbian], and [Jingbian], in eastern Gansu, and in some other counties and districts. This border region is the only remaining area from the period of
the agrarian revolution, and several thousand cadres have survived, of whom only
a very few are hopelessly corrupt. Most of the cadres are good, and some people
have made mistakes but they can be educated. Many of the problems that came up
in their work occurred because we were not clear enough in explaining the policies. For leaders to take a certain responsibility is an important method of work.
Second, there is a politically reliable armed force. Third, the people are good.
Fourth, many healthy work styles from the old regions of the agrarian revolution
period have been preserved. Under these conditions, the enemy can be defeated.

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Notes

Our source of the text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 266–73, where it is reproduced
from a written record of the speech preserved in the Central Archives. The editors of Wenji
indicate that Section I is Mao’s speech, and Sections II, III, and IV are Mao’s comments on
the remarks by others.
1.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.
2.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang army’s First War Zone.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-10
3.  This refers to the early 1944 call by Earl Russell Browder (1891–1973), secretary
general of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), to dissolve the CPUSA and
to form a communist political association as an organized pressure group within a broad
governing coalition. Others opposed this move, the CPUSA was restructured, and Browder
was expelled from the party.
4.  This refers to an article published in Renmin ribao on July 7, 1947, proposing slogans on the current situation in commemoration of the July 7, 1937, Marco Polo Bridge
Incident. The slogans called for thoroughly eliminating Chiang Kaishek’s forces, opposing Chiang Kaishek’s civil war, famine, dictatorship, and traitorous policies, establishing
a democratic coalition government, confiscating bureaucratic capital, implementing land
reform, protecting national industries, and other policies.
5.  Huang Yanpei was managing director of the Chinese Democratic National Construction Association.

--- Notes

6.  The People’s Political Council was the highest consultative body, established by the
Guomindang on March 31, 1938. After the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Guomindang convened a National Assembly and dissolved the People’s Political Council.

7.  The Tehran Conference (November 28, 1943–December 1, 1943) was a meeting of
the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, which took place in Iran, to discuss
defeating fascism and dealing with issues about world order following the end of the war.
The Potsdam Conference (July 17, 1945–August 2, 1945), which took place in Germany,
was a further discussion among the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain
regarding the postwar world order. With the agreement of the Chinese government, the
“Proclamation Defining the Terms for the Japanese Surrender” was issued on July 26,
1945.

8.  See “Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the
Current Situation and Tasks,” February 1, 1947, in Vol. IX, pp. 206–210, of this series.

9.  Harry Pollitt (1890–1960) was general secretary and a founding member of the
Communist Party of Great Britain.

10.  The “General Mobilization Order to Suppress the Insurrection of the Communist
Bandits” was issued by the Guomindang government on July 4, 1947.

11.  The May 4th Directive on the Land Issue, issued by the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party on May 4, 1946, called for reducing rent and interest rates as
well as taking land from landlords and distributing it to peasants.

12.  Du Bincheng (1888–1947, native of Shaanxi) was a leader of the China Democratic
League and in charge of its Northwest branch. Hou Wailu (1903–1987) was a historian.