Lin, Luo, and Gao [1]: Strategic Guidelines: (1) After the first year of operations, with the exception of Shandong, enemy strategic offensives have been halted across all other regions, and our forces have transitioned to the offensive.


Although the enemy in Northern Shaanxi still retains some offensive capability, due to terrain and other factors, their actions have become guerrilla in nature, allowing our forces to conduct proactive operations. The Northeast and Taihang regions have long been on the offensive; Wutai [2], following improvements in leadership, has also been able to launch independent operations. In Shandong, the enemy is concentrating its attacks against our Central Shandong area, but this effort is unlikely to sustain itself, and our forces will gradually shift to the offensive.


During the first year, our forces annihilated a total of 97.5 regular army brigades and 780,000 personnel, along with 340,000 members of puppet forces, security units, and other miscellaneous formations, bringing the overall enemy casualties to 1.12 million.


(2) The enemy’s main force remains deployed along the Southern Front [3]. Including those already destroyed—most of whom have been partially replenished, though with insufficient numbers and reduced combat effectiveness, and some are currently being prepared for further reinforcement—their total strength amounts to 154 brigades. Specifically, Shandong (including Northern Jiangsu) holds 88 brigades, Taihang 26, and the Northwest (encompassing Southern Shanxi, Yulin, Ningxia, but excluding areas west of Lanzhou) 40.


The Northern Front [4] is weaker, comprising 64 brigades (including those previously destroyed). Of these, the Northeast (excluding Eastern Hebei and Northern Chahar [5]) accounts for 24 brigades, while Wutai and Jin-Sui together hold 40 (Sun Lianzhong [6] commands 15 brigades, Fu Zuoyi [7] 10, and Yan Xishan [8] 15).


In the enemy rear, there are 30 brigades assigned to garrison duties: 8 in Xinjiang and Western Gansu, 16 across Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou, and 6 in the southeastern provinces and Taiwan.


Nationwide, the enemy maintains 248 regular army brigades. As of last July, their total troop strength exceeded 1.8 million. Over the past year, we have eliminated 780,000 enemy soldiers, supplemented by 600,000 replacements, while 200,000 deserted. Current troop levels stand at 1.5 million, with plans to add another 1 million over the next year.


Additionally, there are approximately 1 million personnel in specialized units (artillery, engineers, logistics, naval, and air forces), puppet troops, traffic police [9], and security forces (excluding those already destroyed), as well as 1.8 million working in rear-area military institutions.


After one year of fighting, enemy morale has severely declined, with widespread war-weariness among both troops and the civilian population. The Chiang Kai-shek regime has become utterly isolated within the populace.


(3) In the second year, our objective should be to destroy 100 regular enemy brigades and substantial numbers of miscellaneous units, thereby reversing the balance of power so that we enjoy numerical superiority while the enemy falls into a disadvantaged position.


(4) Our forces in Shandong comprise 27 first-class brigades; Taihang (excluding Chen Geng [10]) has 13 first-class and 14 second-class brigades; in the Northwest, the Border Region contributes 6 brigades (4 of which come from Jin-Sui), Chen Geng controls 4, and Jin-Sui another 3; Wutai possesses 9 first-class and 4 second-class brigades; and the Northeast (including Northern Chahar and Eastern Hebei) boasts 32 first- and second-class brigades.


Our entire army totals 112 brigades (excluding the two artillery corps in the Northeast and Shandong, as well as four cavalry brigades in the Northeast and Jin-Sui), numbering 900,000 personnel. Additionally, there are 600,000 members of local forces and 400,000 serving in military administrative organs.


(5) For the second year, our mission in Shandong and Taihang is to secure territory north of the Yangtze River. In the Northwest, we aim to capture most of Gansu and Ningxia. On the Northern Front, our forces should seize control of major sections of the Zhongchang, Beining [11], Pingcheng, Pingshi, Pingsui [12], and Tongpu railways, along with cities along these lines except for Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenyang, thereby isolating those three key urban centers. If possible, capturing Shenyang would be even more advantageous.


Of paramount importance is securing the Pingsui Railway to establish a direct link between the Northeast and North China, enabling our forces in North China and the Northwest to receive critical arms and supplies.


(6) This Northern Front operation should be spearheaded primarily by the Northeastern forces, with Wutai and Jin-Sui providing supporting roles.


(7) The Northeastern forces are currently undergoing a one- to two-month period of rest and reorganization and are expected to launch a new offensive around August or September. Over a span of four to six months, they aim to take control of significant portions of the Zhongchang and Beining railways, seizing the opportunity to capture Changchun, Siping, Liaoyang, Jinzhou, and other cities.


If these objectives are successfully achieved, by next spring a powerful Northeastern corps, in coordination with Wutai and Jin-Sui, should advance to attack the Pingsui Railway.


Once hostilities reach the vicinity of the Pingsui line, the Wutai and Jin-Sui forces will be placed under unified command of Lin and Luo for operational execution.


(8) Assuming the second-year plan proceeds smoothly, in the third year the main forces in Shandong and Taihang can push southward beyond the Yangtze River. Meanwhile, the Northeastern and Wutai forces, after retaining necessary troops to continue operations against Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, and other cities not yet captured in the second year, and to safeguard their respective home regions, may commit substantial reinforcements to operations in the Northwest and south of the Yangtze, with priority given to the Northwest, aiming to seize all provinces there and the entirety of Sichuan, thereby consolidating our rear areas.


(9) The Northeast’s military-industrial complex must provide full support to inland areas. Over the coming year, you are tasked with vigorously establishing large-scale military production facilities.


(10) Our operational doctrine remains unchanged: engage dispersed, isolated enemy units first, then concentrated, powerful formations; capture medium-sized towns and vast rural areas before targeting major cities. Our primary goal is to destroy the enemy’s living forces, rather than simply holding or seizing territory; territorial gains should be seen as a natural outcome of eliminating enemy manpower, often requiring repeated efforts before final occupation can be secured. In each engagement, concentrate an overwhelming advantage in forces, using a small detachment to pin down the enemy frontally while the main body executes a flanking maneuver. Replenish our ranks by capturing all enemy weapons and the vast majority of their personnel—nine-tenths of the rank-and-file soldiers and a few junior officers—and combine this with land reform and industrial development to sustain a protracted war. Moving forward, opportunities for mobile warfare will diminish, with operations increasingly focused on assaulting enemy positions. Therefore, we must significantly strengthen our artillery and engineer capabilities.


(11) The above constitutes a summary of the past year’s operations and our plans for the future. Please share your views at your earliest convenience.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft on a grey afternoon.


Notes [1] Lin refers to Lin Biao, who at the time served as Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic Allied Forces. Luo Gao refers to Luo Ronghuan and Gao Gang, both of whom were Deputy Political Commissars of the same force.


[2] Refers to the Jin-Cha-Ji region.


[3] The Southern Front here denotes the battlefields of East China, Jin-Hebei-Luyu, and the Northwest (including Southern Shanxi, Yulin, and Ningxia, but excluding areas west of Lanzhou).


[4] The Northern Front encompasses the Northeast, Jin-Cha-Ji, and Jin-Sui theaters of operation.


[5] Chahar refers to Chahar Province, see note [3] on page 10 of this volume.


[6] Sun Lianzhong (1893–1990), native of Xiongxian County, Hebei, served as Director of the Baoding Pacification Commission of the Nationalist Army at the time.


[7] Fu Zuoyi was then Director of the Zhangjiakou Pacification Commission of the Nationalist Army.


[8] Yan Xishan held the post of Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Commission of the Nationalist Army at the time.


[9] Traffic Police refers to the Traffic Police Corps. See note [3] on page 170 of this volume.


[10] Chen Geng was at the time Commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army.


[11] Zhongchang refers to the Zhongchang Railway. See note [7] on page 243 of this volume. Beining denotes the railway connecting Beijing via Tianjin to Shenyang, corresponding to the current Beijing–Harbin Line’s section from Beijing to Shenyang.


[12] Pingsui designates the railway from Beijing to Suiyuan (now part of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), specifically to Baotou. This corresponds to the present-day Beijing–Baotou Line.