At Present We Should Adopt the Policy of Dividing Our Forces into Four Routes, Each Fighting Its Own Battles[1]

(July 4, 1947)

Comrades Chen, Su, and Tan, the East China Bureau, and for the information of Comrades Liu and Deng[2]:

We have received your telegram of 0400 hours on the 4th, Comrades Rao and Zhang[3]. (1) To take into account the possibility that the enemy may harass our rear areas, active preparations may be made in the next few days for the task of attacking Tancheng-Matou[4] and Xin’anzhen, and this task is to be carried out immediately when our two columns advancing westward have opened fire along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway[5] and the enemy on the front has begun to withdraw. (2) When the enemy on the front withdraws, the only enemy force that may harass our rear areas will be the 8th Army at Changyi-Weixian[6]. You should organize local corps to cope with this enemy and protect the rear areas, so that not only can three columns be used to carry out the task of moving south, but also, in order to make it easier for the three columns moving south to accomplish the task of wiping out the 51st Division and other units, it will be necessary to use the one column you, Chen, Su, and Tan, have kept in hand to pin down the Guangxi clique forces temporarily in their present positions for a period of time. (3) After the 51st Division has been wiped out, you should be prepared to send two columns straight down to Huaibei and Su

[1] This was a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Chen Yi, commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu, deputy commander, Tan Zhenlin, deputy political commissar, and the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
[2] Liu and Deng: Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.
[3] Rao and Zhang: Rao Shushi and Zhang Yunyi, who were then respectively political commissar and deputy commander of the East China Military Area.
[4] Tancheng-Matou: Tancheng in Shandong Province and Matouzhen, northwest of Tancheng.
[5] Tianjin-Pukou Railway: the railway linking Tianjin and Pukou, now a section of the Beijing-Shanghai line.
[6] Changyi-Weixian: Changle in Shandong Province and Weixian, an old county name, abolished in 1983 and merged into Weifang Municipality, Shandong Province.

At Present We Should Adopt the Policy of Dividing Our Forces into Four Routes, Each Fighting Its Own Battles

bei, so as to open up a new situation. Leave two columns on the northern front and move them quickly to the Qingdao-Jinan Railway line to prepare for operations against the 8th Army. (4) In thus dividing our forces into four routes to strike at the enemy’s rear and completely ignoring his main force, we are acting on the principle that, since the enemy on the front is extremely concentrated and offers no good opportunity for battle, we should first strike the weaker enemy forces and then the stronger ones, and that you fight your way and I fight my way (each fighting its own battles). This is the policy of fighting with the utmost initiative and throwing the enemy into a passive position. Under present circumstances, this policy can be effective. (5) How many local brigades are there in the four areas of Jiaodong, Bohai, Binhai, and Luzhong? Is it possible to concentrate several brigades to form one or two new columns, so that there will be three or four field columns on the northern front? (6) Later, when the enemy’s main force is dispersed and gives us an opportunity to strike, we can still concentrate four or five of our main columns for operations.

The Military Commission
1800 hours, July 4