Do Not Fight Battles in Which You Are Not
Assured of Victory
(June 22, 1947, 3:00 P.M.)
To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Liu
[Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1
We received your telegram of the 19th.2
	 1.	 After Siping is captured in the Northeast, the next step has not been decided.
The next step for Nie [Rongzhen]’s region3 is to watch for a chance to move
in the direction of the [Bei]ping-[Tian]jin and [Bei]ping-Bao[ding] railways.
The plan for Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping] to launch an attack at the
end of the month remains unchanged. In northern Shanxi, as soon as Chen
Geng’s4 troops arrive, they plan to attack the enemy at Yulin and the three
cities of Dingbian, Anbian, and Jingbian, and then to move southward. The
student movement in Chiang [Kaishek]’s regions is inactive at the moment,
but it is preparing for another upsurge.
	 2.	 It has been reported that because of the crisis in the Northeast, Chiang has
ordered Du Yuming5 to hold fast for two months, air support will be sent to
the Northeast as soon as Shandong is taken care of, and so on. The military situation in Shandong remains pivotal to the overall situation. Your general
guidelines in conducting operations should still be to launch an attack only
when assured of victory. If victory is assured, it is all right to fight either
primary or secondary enemy positions. Otherwise, it is better to exercise
restraint for the time being, and you should not fight battles in which you are
not assured of victory.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 111–12, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Chen
Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was
deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Liu Bocheng and
Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu
(Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that Chiang Kaishek had begun to use the
Japanese war criminal Yasuji Okamura as a consultant and that Okamura advised, “Reduplication is better than advancing side-by-side, advancing together is better than separately.” The Guomindang was using the military tactic of advancing three or four of its
reorganized armies one after another and amassing military supplies and manpower in the
mountainous areas and key villages.

3.  Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei
Military Region.

4.  Chen Geng was commander of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.

5.  Du Yuming was deputy director of the Guomindang government’s Northeast Field
Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-319