To Chen, Su, Tan, and Chen; to Zhang, Rao, Deng, and Li [1]; also to Liu and Deng [2]: Your telegram of the 20th [3] has been received.


The annihilation of the 74th Division entailed heavy casualties, but it was of immense significance. It demonstrated that, in the present operational area, provided one avoids haste and refrains from splitting forces, it is possible to defeat the enemy’s offensive by destroying its units piecemeal and achieve a decisive victory. Moreover, operating in this particular area is most advantageous for us and most disadvantageous for the enemy.


At present, all fronts across the country except Shandong have gone over to the offensive; however, the purpose of these offensives is to assist the main theater—Shandong—in breaking the enemy’s attack. The ever-expanding people’s struggle within Chiang Kai-shek’s controlled territories serves the same function. Similarly, Liu and Deng’s forthcoming operation next month will also play such a role.


As for the operational approach in Shandong, the plan is to concentrate our entire main force north of the line running through Jinan, Linyi, and Haizhou, with a view to spending six to seven months (starting in May) and sustaining some sixty to seventy thousand casualties while systematically annihilating the enemy along that line. The day this line is breached will mark a major strategic victory throughout the theater; thereafter, all subsequent operations will proceed more smoothly.


There are two courses of action for the immediate future: (1) After a few days of rest and reorganization, implement the measures outlined in your telegram of the 20th: employ three columns to seize Weixian [4], and use six columns to engage any enemy reinforcements. Columns Six and Seven should remain in the northern sector and not be dispersed—this is entirely appropriate. (2) Further postpone the Weixian operation (it has already been delayed once, following our successful engagement with the 74th Division, which was highly correct), and instead consider first attacking the Fifth Army. This unit is currently stationed at Laiwu and Yanzhuang, relatively isolated, but we do not yet know how strong its fortifications are. What is your assessment of our chances in attacking this force? Furthermore, how confident are you that our troops can pin down the Eleventh Division and other units, preventing them from coming to reinforce? Please give this matter careful consideration, weigh the pros and cons thoroughly, and report back promptly.


If we can first destroy the Fifth Army (or one or two of its divisions) together with several other enemy formations, and only then turn to Chang [5] and Weixian, the benefits would be considerable. For whenever we move against Chang and Weixian, the enemy is certain to send reinforcements. The earlier we act, the larger those reinforcements will be, and the more difficult it will be for us to deal with them; conversely, the later we strike—after having eliminated additional enemy units on the main front—the smaller the reinforcements will be, and the easier it will be for us to repel them. Therefore, the attack on Weixian should be regarded as an important means of seizing the initiative and forcing the enemy into a passive position, and we ought to avoid resorting to it prematurely. We should undertake this operation only when there is absolutely no prospect of further engagements along the main front. Please advise accordingly.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript under the direction of the Military Commission, Renovation Year. Notes [1] Chen, Su, Tan, and Chen refer to Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, and Chen Shiju, who at the time served respectively as Commander and Political Commissar, Deputy Commander, Deputy Political Commissar, and Chief of Staff of the East China Field Army. Zhang, Rao, Deng, and Li denote Zhang Yunyi, Rao Shushi, Deng Zihui, and Li Yu, who held the posts of Deputy Commander of the East China Military Region, Political Commissar, Deputy Secretary of the CPC East China Bureau, and Deputy Political Commissar of the East China Military Region, respectively. [2] Liu and Deng stand for Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who at the time were Commander and Political Commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army. [3] Gao refers to the twentieth day. [4] Weixian corresponds to today’s Hanting District of Weifang City. [5] Chang denotes Chang’le County in Shandong Province.