Chiang Kaishek’s Strategy of Driving
Our Army North of the Yellow River
Will Come to Naught
(May 11, 1947, 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M.)
To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Peng [Dehuai]
and Xi [Zhongxun], and for the information of Zhu [De] and Liu [Shaoqi]:1
	 1.	 After Chiang Kaishek enforced the plan that blocked up the outlets of the
Yellow River, his persistent policy has been as follows: first, drive our troops
north of the Yellow River; second, destroy our forces there.
	 2.	 Last February, when Liu and Deng’s forces crossed the river for rest and
reorganization, Chiang thought they had been driven out and would not be
able to cross the river again. He therefore dared to use Wang Jingjiu’s2 army
in Shandong.
	 3.	 For a long time, the gap at Tai’an has been open. We instructed Chen and
Su’s army to cross to the north. Chen and Su did not listen and annihilated
Li Xianzhou. Chiang thereupon opened Jiaozhou and Ji’nan and blockaded
Tai’an, forcing Chen and Su to withdraw to the north and west.  From now
on, our policy must be for all front-line enemy units (including the Fifth
Army, the Eleventh, Seventy-fourth, Eighty-third, Twenty-fifth, Sixty-fifth,
Seventh, and Forty-eighth divisions, and so on) to move toward Jiaozhou
and Ji’nan. If Chen and Su had just let go and given ground, the enemy certainly would have misunderstood this to mean that we were afraid of battle
and it would have thought it had succeeded in driving us out.

	 4.	 This time, Hu Zongnan’s3 attack was also to drive us east of the river. Hu
occupied Qingjian on March 31, and intentionally deferred going to Suide
to leave a path for our troops. Not until April 26, almost one month later,
did Hu order Dong Zhao4 to lead eight-and-a-half brigades north, arriving
at Suide on May 2. At the time, he really thought his army would be able to
drive us to cross the river. Only when our army occupied Panlong on May
5 did Hu begin to realize that our troops were near Yan’an. He then ordered
Dong Zhao to immediately withdraw southward, leaving Suide opened up
without a single soldier to defend it. This indicates that the purpose of Hu’s
army was not to open up the Xian-Yu Highway, but rather to drive our troops
across the river.
	 5.	 When Chen and Su break through Gu Zhutong’s5 front, Liu and Deng cross
the river southward, and Peng and Xi march toward eastern Gansu and central Shaanxi, Chiang will finally see that his dream has come to naught.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 68–69, where it is
reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Su Yu was deputy commander,
respectively, of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army. Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi
Zhongxun was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army.

2.  Wang Jingjiu was commander of the Second Corps of the Xuzhou Command Headquarters of the Guomindang’s Ground Forces General Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-308

3.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.

4.  Dong Zhao was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized First Army.

5.  Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s Ground Forces. At the
beginning of March 1947, he formed the Ground Forces General Headquarters in Xuzhou
to unify the forces of the Xuzhou and Zhengzhou Pacification Offices under one command.