Attack on Changwei May Trigger Several Situations and the Methods for Handling Them[1]

(May 6, 1947)

Chen, Su, and inform Liu, Deng[2]:

The short telegram of the 4th and the long telegram of today (the 6th) are presumed to have reached you. For the purpose of clearing the rear area and luring the enemy deep, please consider deploying a strong force to attack the enemy at Changle and Weixian[3]. It is estimated that such an action may trigger several situations: (1) If the enemy at Mengyin and Xintai moves deep into the Changwei area to provide reinforcement, and if conditions are favorable for striking, then use the main force to separately annihilate the reinforcing enemy, and then capture Chang and Wei; (2) If conditions are unfavorable for striking, then use a force of sufficient strength to block and hold the reinforcing enemy south of Chang and Wei, so as to facilitate the capture of Chang and Wei; (3) If it is impossible either to block the reinforcing enemy or to capture Chang and Wei, then change the action of attacking Chang and Wei to a feint attack, luring the reinforcing enemy deep, so as to facilitate the shift of our main force to operations behind the enemy lines; (4) If the enemy dares not send reinforcements, then we will have ample time to capture Chang and Wei, thereby achieving the objective of clearing the rear route. Please advise whether this is feasible.

Military Commission

Yushen

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Commander and Political Commissar Chen Yi and Deputy Commander Su Yu of the East China Field Army.

[2] Liu and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

[3] Weixian, an old county name, was abolished in 1983 and merged into Weifang City, Shandong Province.