Do Not Be Impatient or Disperse Our
Forces; Lure the Enemy in Deep and Seize
Opportunities for Combat
 (May 6, 1947)
To Chen [Yi] and Su [Yu], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng
[Xiaoping]:1
On the 4th, we received your telegram sent on the 3rd, and we immediately
replied with several suggestions, which we assume you have received. Today,
we received your telegram of the 2nd,2 and learned that you annihilated 3,000
of the enemy at Qingtuosi,3 but we lost an opportunity to annihilate the enemy
because the First Column had been sent far off to Ningyang, and there was not
enough time to concentrate our forces to strike a forceful blow at the Seventyfourth Division and other units. In the current situation, the enemy is in a hurry,
and we are not. From [the battle at] Qingtuosi, we learned the lesson that we
should not disperse our forces. Not only must the First and Sixth columns not be
sent out too early, but the Seventh Column should also stay in the coastal area
for about a month to pin down [the enemy], and then move southward, depending on the situation. Consequently, in May and June, all your troops, except for
the Seventh Column located in the coastal area, should amass in the Laiwu and

Nishui areas, rest and reorganize, wait until the enemy forces move forward, or
some other change occurs, and then seize the opportunity to annihilate the enemy.
First, do not be impatient; second, do not disperse our forces. As long as we retain
control of our main forces, we will eventually have the opportunity to destroy
the enemy. In any action, one must never consider only one possibility, but must
keep two possibilities in mind. For example, when we seek to induce the enemy
to move, it may or may not do so; it is possible that a large part will be induced
to move, or only a small part. If the situation is uncertain, our main forces should
stay in locations that enable us to deal with both possibilities. On this last occasion, your attention was focused on the western area and you did not foresee that
Tang [Enbo]’s4 main forces might advance northward. You did not amass your
main forces in the appropriate locations before the event. If you had done so, you
would have been able to destroy not only the Fifth Army, the Eleventh Division,
and other units by striking eastward from the western areas, but also the Seventyfourth Division and others by striking northward from the southern areas. You
also did not have enough time to concentrate your forces when you fought at
Qingtuosi, but the loss of a single opportunity is not all that important. When the
situation is unfavorable for battle, it is quite correct to avoid provoking the enemy
and to wait patiently for an opportunity. On the other hand, after our major victory
in the battle of Tai’an,5 the enemy’s panic is growing deeper day by day, and we
think there may be an opportunity to annihilate it during the months of May and
June. Even if there is no such opportunity, provided that the enemy forces march
to the Tai’an-Laiwu-Nishui line, it is best to allow them to advance to the Zibo
area. You should then retreat to the Zibo region or the area north of Zibo. You
may pretend to withdraw to Hebei to mislead the enemy. Our main forces should
keep their distance from the enemy and not occupy territory. Do not fire a single
shot at the front, side, or rear of the enemy, so that it may march confidently forward without having the slightest idea where our main forces are located. Then,
when the circumstances are favorable, we should attack. When the circumstances
are not favorable for an attack, we should shift our main forces to the enemy’s
rear, and the situation will eventually change. Last time, when Hu Zongnan6 used
thirty-one brigades to invade our Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, an area
with a population of only 1,500,000, and he amassed eleven or sometimes ten or
nine brigades to form a battlefield in an area 40 to 50 li square, depriving us of the
opportunity to strike a devastating blow, we applied precisely the aforementioned method to deal with them. We paid no attention to enemy troop concentrations (on
this occasion, nine-and-a-half brigades invaded Suide, and we did not fire a single
shot). Instead, we concentrated our entire force on attacking the enemy’s rear
area, forcing it into an absolutely passive position. This may serve as reference
for you. The differences between this case and your situation are that the terrain
in Shandong is narrower and your forces are very large and difficult to maneuver.
Consequently, you should adjust the measures to fit your terrain and make decisions based on the specific situation.
The Military Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 58–60, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Su Yu was deputy commander,
respectively, of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Chen Yi and Su Yu stated that while the East China Field Army
was attacking Tai’an, the enemy continued to storm Xintai and Mengyin to incite an attack
and end the battle. The East China Field Army took the initiative to abandon Xintai and
Mengyin, and it attacked Ningyang, shifting the enemy’s Fifth Army west and splitting
it up, while the main force moved east to support an attack on the enemy forces entering
Mengyin. Chen and Su’s troops defeated about two regiments of the Guomindang’s Eightythird Division south of Qingtuosi, but they had not yet attacked the enemy’s Seventy-fourth
Division and other units.

3.  Qingtuosi (now called Qingtuo) is a town in southwestern Yi’nan county, Shandong,
on the north bank of the Meng River.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-305

4.  Tang Enbo was commander of the First Army Group of the Xuzhou Command
Headquarters under the Guomindang army’s Ground Forces General Headquarters.

5.  The Tenth and Thirteenth columns of the East China Field Army surrounded Tai’an
from April 22 to 26, annihilating the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Seventy-second
Division (minus one brigade) and taking division commander Yang Wenquan (1905–1973,
native of Sichuan) prisoner.

6.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.