The Combat Missions of the Units Commanded by Liu, Deng, Chen, and Su in Southern Shanxi and Northern Shaanxi
(May 4, 1947)
To Liu and Deng, Chen and Xie, Chen and Su; also to Peng and Xi:
It is now certain that the following points hold: (1) The joint mission of the forces under Liu-Deng and Chen-Su is to cooperate in defeating the Gu-Zhu system. (2) The joint mission of the forces in southern Shanxi (Chen-Xie) and northern Shaanxi is to cooperate in defeating the Hu Zongnan [5] system. (3) The 100,000-strong Liu-Deng force shall immediately begin rest and reorganization, completing this before moving east. After crossing the Yellow River, it will operate independently through Hebei-Shandong-Henan into the Central Plains, using the border areas of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, as well as the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region, as its base. Its operational area will be north of the Yangtze River, south of the Yellow River, east of the line between Tongguan and Nanyang, and west of the Jinpu Railway. It may attack Zhengzhou–Hankou, Kaifeng–Xuzhou, the Funiu Mountains, or the Dabie Mountains, adapting its actions to the situation.
[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the CPC Central Committee to Commander Liu Bocheng and Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army.
[2] “Chen and Xie” refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who at that time served respectively as commander and political commissar of the Fourth Column of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army. “Chen and Su” refers to Chen Yi and粟裕, who at that time served respectively as commander and political commissar, and deputy commander, of the East China Field Army.
[3] “Peng and Xi” refers to Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun, who at that time served respectively as commander and political commissar, and deputy political commissar, of the Northwest Field Army Corps.
[4] Gu Zhutong was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s General Headquarters. In early March 1947, he established the Xuzhou Command within the General Headquarters in Xuzhou, unifying command over the troops previously under the Xuzhou and Zhengzhou Pacification Offices.
[5] Hu Zongnan was at that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s First War Zone.
[6] The Jinpu Railway refers to the railway line from Tianjin to Pukou, which today forms part of the Beijing–Shanghai Railway.
[7] “Bianxu” refers to Kaifeng in Henan Province and Xuzhou in Jiangsu Province.

Flexibility and maneuverability are essential, with close coordination required with the Chen-Su forces. Whenever joint operations are necessary, the Chen-Su forces shall be under the command of Liu-Deng. (4) The main body of the Chen-Xie forces (four brigades) is to remain in position, standing by for orders, ready at any time to cross the river either downstream or upstream, under the command of Peng and Xi, with the aim of annihilating Hu Zongnan and other recalcitrant elements, retaking Yan’an, defending Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, and seizing the Greater Northwest.

Central Committee
Chen Branch, Zi Stem

As long as there is patience, opportunities to destroy the enemy will always arise.
(May 4, 1947)
To Chen and Su; also to Liu and Deng:
We have received both your telegrams dated the 1st and 2nd of May. Given the enemy’s dense formation, direct assault would be difficult. Your decision to exercise restraint and await a favorable opportunity is entirely appropriate. With sufficient patience, chances to defeat the enemy will inevitably present themselves. You may relocate your rear areas to the vast regions south of Jiaodong, Bohai, and the Jiaoji Railway, thereby luring the enemy deeper in, allowing them to occupy Laiwu, Yishui, and Ju County, where they will become hopelessly bogged down. Only then should you launch your attack; it will not be too late. However, two conditions must be met: first, extreme patience; second, concentration of maximum available forces. Moreover, avoid alarming the enemy’s rear prematurely. Therefore, please consider whether it would be advisable to temporarily suspend your southward advance. An early move could provoke a hasty retreat by the enemy, making subsequent engagement significantly more challenging. Ultimately, however, the final decision rests with you.

Military Commission
Branch of the Tiger, Branch of the Pig
[1] In March 1947, the Nationalist forces were compelled to shorten their front lines, abandoning their all-out offensive against the liberated areas and concentrating their efforts instead on key attacks against northern Shaanxi and Shandong. On the Shandong front, the Nationalists massed 24 reorganized divisions, adopting a new tactic of dense, steady advances without readily dispersing their forces, steadily pushing toward central Shandong. This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the CPC Central Military Commission to Commander and Political Commissar Chen Yi and Deputy Commander粟裕of the East China Field Army.
[2] “Liu and Deng” refers to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who at that time served respectively as commander and political commissar of the Jin-Hebei-Luyu Field Army.