The enemy situation is changing; our main force should wait for opportunities at its present position

(April 9, 1947)

Peng and Xi[1]:

(1) The enemy situation is changing. It is feasible to implement the method you previously proposed of dispersing three or four battalions, each carrying a radio, to harass the enemy on all sides[2], while the main force waits for opportunities at its present position, which is advantageous. In addition, please consider having Wang Shitai[3] raid the highway between Luochuan and Sanyuan. (2) Chen and Xie[4], in addition to capturing Yicheng and Houma,

[1] Peng and Xi refers to Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun, who were then respectively serving as commander and political commissar, and deputy political commissar, of the Northwest Field Army.

[2] In a telegram to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 21:00 on April 2, 1947, Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun stated: Since the battle at Qinghuabian, the enemy has been unusually cautious. They avoid main roads and flat plains, exclusively taking small paths and climbing high mountains; they do not set up camp in houses but mostly bivouac in the open; they do not advance in a single column but march in multiple parallel columns with very small intervals. For example, after the battle at Qinghuabian on the 25th, on the 27th they invaded with the 123rd Brigade, 135th Brigade, and 165th Brigade, with two brigades advancing along the mountain ridges on both sides of the main road from Qinghuabian to Guaimao, and one brigade accompanying the baggage train. Another division advanced northward toward Chakou from a point over ten li east of Guaimao, with the 90th Division on the left flank of the 1st Division. This is one example. As a result, a three-sided ambush is no longer possible, and any single-sided attack on the enemy becomes a frontal assault. This enemy tactic, resembling a rolling millstone, reduces our opportunities to destroy the enemy piecemeal. We must patiently and over a long period wear them down, exhaust them, force them to disperse, and seek out their weak points. At present, the enemy troops are extremely fatigued, and stragglers, deserters, and runaways are increasing daily. To counter this enemy tactic of employing massive compact formations, we propose dispersing three to four battalions, organized into squads of one to two companies each (as guerrilla warfare by the masses has not yet begun), and assigning capable commanders to harass the enemy on all sides—front, rear, left, and right—to cut their communication lines, wear them down, and compel them to disperse part of their forces for garrisoning and securing communication routes, thereby creating opportunities to strike at their dispersed units and ambush their reinforcements. We intend to try this method. Please advise whether it is appropriate.

[3] Wang Shitai was then serving as acting commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Army.

[4] Chen and Xie refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who were then respectively serving as commander and political commissar of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

also captured Xinjiang and Jishan on the 7th and 8th[1], taking many prisoners. They have been ordered to advance toward Hejin and other places.

Mao Zedong
9th

[1] In a report to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on April 8, 1947, regarding the capture of Xinjiang and Jishan, Chen Geng, Xie Fuzhi, Wang Xinting, and Han Jun stated that Xinjiang was captured on April 7 and Jishan on April 8.