Questions on a Plan of Action for the
Northwest Field Operations Corps
 (April 6, 1947, 1:00 P.M.)
To Peng [Dehuai] and Xi [Zhongxun]:1
We received the two telegrams you sent on April 4.2 Please tell us your thoughts
on the following points so we can consider a plan of action:
	 1.	 After you advance to the area between Suide, Shuangmiaowan, Wa[yaobao],
and Qingjian, if it is difficult to attack to the south, is it possible for you to
attack to the north, wipe out the effective strength of the Deng [Baoshan]-
Gao [Shuangcheng] forces,3 replenish your ranks, and reduce the threat
on the north side? If you attack the Deng-Gao forces, what is the plan of
attack? (If the Deng-Gao forces do not launch an attack, we must storm their
fortifications.)
	 2.	 Has Ma Hongkui reached Dingbian yet, and how many troops does he have
in total? If we advance to the Suide area but find that attacking either to the
south or to the north is difficult, should we shift to attack Ma Hongkui and
then attack the enemy forces in eastern Gansu and central Shaanxi? Or do we attack Ma Hongkui4 directly from our present location and then attack
eastern Gansu?
	 3.	 The plan to attack Yanchang, Linzhen, and Ganquan is very good, but if Hu
[Zongnan]’s5 troops do not enter Suide and they withdraw prematurely, will
this hamper our future operations? Would it be more beneficial for our future
operations to lure Hu’s troops north into Suide?
	 4.	 Would it be better simply to rest for a few days, wait until we have a clearer
picture of the situation, and then decide how to proceed?
Mao [Zedong]
---

Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 26–27, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar and Xi Zhongxun was deputy
political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Field Army.

2.  The telegrams from Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun reported unsuccessful attacks on
the Guomindang’s Twelfth and 135th brigades, and uncertainty about the enemy’s current
situation. Based on intelligence reports, the Northwest Field Army planned to assemble
troops between Suide, Qingjian, Wayaobao, and Shuangmiaowan and then try to wipe out
one or two enemy brigades when the enemy advanced to Suide, but the concentration of
enemy troops made the outcome questionable. Another option was to fight the Seventy-sixth
Division in Yanchang and Yanchuan, attack the Fiftieth Brigade, and then leave Ganquan,
Fu county, and Guanzhong. They requested instructions on which plan was preferable.

3.  Deng Baoshan (1894–1968, born in Tianshui, Gansu) was general commander of
the Guomindang Army Headquarters for the Shanxi-Shaanxi-Suiyuan Border Region.
Gao Shuangcheng (1882–1945, native of Weinan, Shaanxi [present-day Linwei District of
Weinan city]) had been commander of the Twenty-second Army under that headquarters,
but he died of illness in 1945. The current commander of the Twenty-second Army was Zuo
Shiyun (1889–1960, born in Chang’an, Shaanxi).
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-290

4.  Ma Hongkui was deputy director of the Nationalist government’s Northwest Field
Headquarters.

5.  Hu Zongnan was commander of the Guomindang’s First War Zone.