Facilitating the Annihilation of the Enemy
Should Be a Criterion for Considering Battle
Operations
 (March 6, 1947)
To Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], Zhang [Yunyi], and Li [Yu], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin],
and Chen [Shiju], and for the information of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1
We received your telegram of midday on the 4th.2 It is essential for the five columns of your main forces to secure a period of two weeks or more to rest and reorganize. As for your next move, you can consider several plans now and see how
the enemy’s situation develops before deciding. But facilitating the annihilation
of the enemy should be a criterion in considering action. No matter where it takes
place, if the enemy can be wiped out in large numbers, this will constitute a threat
to the enemy and represent cooperation with friendly armies, so it is not necessary
to worry about the time being short or long. Right now, it is also unnecessary to
worry about the timing of the move to the exterior lines because part of the main
force of the five divisions has crossed the river and arrived in Taiyue, and another
part is awaiting the chance to cross northward. As for Wang Shusheng’s3 forces in
western Hubei, some of them have crossed the river and gone to western Hunan,4 and the others have stayed where they were. Therefore, the Central Committee’s
original order that had you moving to the exterior lines ahead of schedule to assist
the five divisions may now be changed, and basically the rest of this year can be
spent fighting the interior lines. Regarding our East China Army, within the next
ten months, assuming an average of four to five enemy brigades are annihilated
each month at a cost of 6,000 to 7,000 casualties, they must wipe out a total of
forty to fifty enemy brigades at a cost of up to 60,000 to 70,000 casualties (next
year’s figures are not included in this estimate). You must take protracted warfare
as your starting point and see to it that the majority of cadres establish this mindset.
Only by always economizing on human and material resources in all places can we
defeat Chiang Kaishek and accomplish China’s historic task. With the same task of
long-term fighting, our forces under Liu and Deng also need to rest, reorganize, and
be reinforced at this time to regain their full strength. As for their next move, what
appears most appropriate is to attack the two forces under Wang Zhonglian and Sun
Zhen5 north of the Yellow River and coordinate with East China from a distance.
Under normal conditions (excluding special circumstances), the troops under Liu
and Deng must stay north of the Yellow River, basically doing away with the two
units under Wang and Sun and drawing the two divisions under the command of
Wu Shaozhou6 north of the Yellow River and annihilate them there. After that it
would be advantageous to move southward to Longhai because the Yellow River
is rising, and the situation now is different from what it was previously. It also
seems best for your Third Column to stay where it is for rest and reorganization so
that later it can join the main force in the fighting. Do not obstruct the northward
advance of the enemy’s [Tian]jin-Pu[kou railway] group but let them get to the
Tai’an line; this would be most advantageous for us. It would be very good if the
two columns, one under Wang [Jian’an] and the other under Xu [Shiyou],7 were
able to annihilate the Eighth Army and take Wei county,8 but if conditions do not
permit this, it would be better to have them rest and reorganize to ensure that it will
always be possible to amass sixty regiments for action in future battles.
The Military Commission
Fourth Army of the Northwest Hubei Military Region under Li Renlin to create the Jiangnan Guerrilla Unit. On May 1, they received orders from the Central Committee to cross
the river and return north.
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 1–3, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Chen Yi was commander, Rao Shushi was political commissar, Zhang Yunyi was deputy
commander, and Li Yu was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China
Military Region. Su Yu was deputy commander, Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar, and Chen Shiju (1909–1995, born in Wuhan) was chief-of-staff, respectively, of the
East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political
commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that the East China Field Army was taking the
five columns around Zhangdian and Zhoucun to rest and reorganize and to create favorable
conditions to lure the enemy forces on the Younan line deep into the mountains and then to
annihilate them there. They proposed further detailed movements for Liu and Deng’s troops.

3.  Wang Shusheng was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Hubei
Military Region.

4.  On February 14, 1947, chief-of-staff of the Northwest Hubei Military Region,
Zhang Caiqian, led more than one thousand men across the Yangzi River south of Hubei’s
Yidu county to the Hunan-Hubei Border Region. On March 3, they joined forces with the
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-280

5.  Wang Zhonglian was commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Twentysixth Army. Sun Zhen was commander of the Guomindang army’s Fifth Pacification
Zone.

6.  Wu Shaozhou (1902–1966, Miao nationality, born in Tianzhu county, Guizhou) was
commander of the Guomindang army’s Reorganized Eighty-fifth Division, which included
the Reorganized Twenty-third and 110th brigades. Mao here uses the old designations
before the reorganization: the Eighty-fifth Army and its Twenty-third and 110th divisions.

7.  These were the East China Army’s Eighth and Ninth columns, respectively.

8.  This county was incorporated into the city of Weifang in Shandong Province in 1983.