Our Army’s Plan of Action Following the
Laiwu Campaign
(February 24, 1947)
To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], Tan [Zhenlin], Liu [Bocheng], and Deng [Xiaoping], and
for the information of Rao [Shushi]:1
	 1.	 Today we received the telegram that Chen, Su, and Tan sent at 18:00 on
February 23.2 We were very pleased to learn that 50,000 troops under Li
Xianzhou3 have been wiped out. All officers and men are to be commended.
	 2.	 We agree with the opinion of Chen, Su, and Tan. First, we should use one
unit to destroy the railway and allow the main forces rest and reorganize
for five or six days. After that, we should carry out the Jiaoji Campaign.
We hope that during the first ten days of March you can annihilate the
entire Twelfth Army and part of both the Ninety-sixth and Eighth armies,
and open transport routes between the Bohai and the Jiaodong areas and the
central Shandong area so we can use the manpower and material resources
of Jiaodong and Bohai to provide for the needs of the army’s protracted campaign. This will also benefit our future efforts to assemble the largest
possible fighting force to attack the forces of Ou Zhen and Wang Jingjiu.4
	 3.	 Except for one unit used to monitor Wang Jingjiu, the main forces of Liu and
Deng’s army (five columns in all) should be assembled north of the Yellow
River to reinforce the area, rest and reorganize, and replenish their ranks.
They should wait until our troops in eastern China have completed the Jiaoji
mission, and then they should be prepared to find the proper opportunity for
the two armies to join forces and wipe out Ou and Wang. Please order the
Sixth and Seventh columns to quickly take a shortcut and draw in toward the
main forces.
The Military Commission
---

Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 667–68, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was
deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Liu Bocheng and
Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu
Field Army. Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region.

2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. reported that the East China Field Army had encircled the Seventy-third Army of Li Xianzhou (1894–1988, native of Shandong), the Forty-sixth Army, and the Reorganized Thirty-sixth Division of the Twelfth Army, annihilating
some 50,000 enemy troops and capturing Li Xianzhou and the two other commanders.
They then sent Song Shilun’s and Xu Shiyou’s forces to attack Boshan and the Jiaoji (Qingdao-Ji’nan) railway, and the main force planned to rest for a few days before advancing to
the north with full strength. They expected the forces of Ou Zhen and Wang Jingjiu (1902–
1964, native of Jiangsu) to converge at the Jinpu (Tianjin-Pukou) railway in Yanzhou.

3.  Li Xianzhou was deputy commander of the Guomindang’s Second Pacification
Zone.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-278

4.  Ou Zhen was commander of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Nineteenth Army.
Wang Jingjiu was commander of the Guomindang’s Twenty-seventh Army.