Attack the Weaker Enemies First, Then the
Stronger Enemies; Strive for an Advantage
 (February 6, 1947)
To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Rao [Shushi],
Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], Zhang [Dingcheng], Deng [Zihui], Liu [Bocheng], and
Deng [Xiaoping]:1
	 1.	 We completely agree with the third plan2 in the telegram from the early afternoon of February 5. This can put us in a completely advantageous position
and cause Chiang Kaishek to fall into a completely disadvantaged position.
	 2.	 Within the next one week to ten days, the whole army should carry out training and reorganization in its existing location, giving outsiders the impression that it will attack to the south. Wait until the enemy’s Twelfth Army
has taken over Laiwu and the enemy’s Seventy-third Army and Forty-sixth
Division have captured the Xintai-Boshan line, and then secretly move the
whole army (minus one column). First wipe out the Seventy-third Army, the
Twelfth Army, and the Forty-sixth Division, and then storm and capture the
entire Jiaoji [Qingdao-Ji’nan] railway. This will require one to one-and-a-half months. Meanwhile, the enemy forces to the south will have moved to their disadvantage deep into the mountainous region north of Linyi. We can
counterattack with all our forces, wiping out large numbers of the enemy. In
short, attack the weaker enemy forces first and strike the stronger ones later.
Strive to gain the advantage and avoid putting yourself in a disadvantaged
position.
	 3.	 To make Wang Yaowu3 feel free to head south, we should end our attacks in
the Bohai region.
The Military Commission
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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 658–59, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu
was deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar. Rao Shushi,
Zhang Yunyi, and Li Yu were political commissar, deputy commander, and deputy political
commissar, respectively, of the East China Military Region. Zhang Dingcheng and Deng
Zihui were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar,
respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army.

2.  The third battle plan that Chen Yi et al. proposed in their telegram to the Central
Military Commission was that if the enemy forces on the south line do not advance, then
almost the entire main force should hasten northward, wipe out the enemy forces on the
north line, destroy the Jiaoji line, and threaten the forces on the south line. Only one column would remain in the Linyi region to engage the enemy. This would lure the south-line
enemy forces into the mountains north of Linyi or drive them to reinforce the Jiaoji railway.
The Communist forces would then counterattack with full strength and wipe out the enemy
units one by one.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-273

3.  Wang Yaowu was commander of the Guomindang’s Second Pacification Zone.