This document〔２〕 could not be issued last year, but it can be issued now.
It is now beneficial to draw conclusions for the entire Party regarding both the overall situation and specific issues.
The general situation is that a revolutionary upsurge is imminent.
Such upsurges have occurred three times in China’s history over the past half-century: the first was the Xinhai Revolution, the second was the Northern Expedition, and the third was the War of Resistance Against Japan. All three were nationwide in scale.
Other movements, such as the May Fourth Movement and the May Thirtieth Movement〔３〕, as well as the Land Revolution War, did not reach the same level; moreover, the Land Revolution War never expanded to a national scope.
A fourth nationwide revolutionary upsurge may soon arrive.
In the first revolutionary upsurge, the proletariat did not participate in the leadership—there was no Communist Party at that time—and it was led by the Tongmenghui〔４〕.
The second and third upsurges were jointly led by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
This current upsurge, however, is being led solely by the Communist Party.


Some comrades may doubt whether a revolutionary upsurge is truly on the horizon, believing that such an upsurge occurs only once every few years and is therefore not easily achieved.
Indeed, it is not easy; yet, judging from the recent situation, an upsurge is definitely approaching.
Whenever a revolutionary upsurge emerges, it is invariably because the enemy has weaknesses that provide us with opportunities to act—otherwise, it would be very difficult.
For example, the second revolutionary upsurge took place between the First and Second World Wars, while this present upsurge follows the Second World War.
Each revolutionary upsurge carries a national character and is anti-imperialist; this one is directed against U.S. imperialism.
The Sino-U.S. Commercial Treaty〔５〕 signed between the Kuomintang government and the U.S. government aims to turn China into a U.S. colony, a goal that will remain unchanged even if U.S. forces withdraw from China.


As stated in the document: “This situation has arisen under conditions where U.S. imperialism and its lackey Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its lackey Wang Jingwei〔６〕, adopting policies to transform China into a U.S. colony, launching a civil war, and intensifying fascist dictatorship. Under these reactionary policies of the U.S. and Chiang, the Chinese people have no other way forward except through struggle. The struggle for independence, peace, and democracy remains the fundamental demand of the Chinese people in the current period.”
〔７〕 I have previously mentioned that there are three possible outcomes in our confrontation with the Kuomintang: major, medium, or minor conflict. Now it appears that the likelihood of a minor conflict is very low, while the prospect of a major one is quite high.


The resolution of the Sixth National Congress of the Party pointed out that two basic contradictions remain unresolved, and they still persist today. Consequently, a revolutionary upsurge is inevitable.
The driving force behind this revolution comprises two fronts: the mass movement in the liberated areas and that in the Kuomintang-controlled regions, with the former playing the dominant role.
The greater the victories in the liberated areas, the sooner the upsurge will come.


Can we achieve victory? Based on past experience, the three major fascist states〔８〕 were all defeated. Why then should the U.S.-Kuomintang alliance be invincible? From every angle, the enemy can be overcome.


Currently, our most challenging area is that covered by the Fifth Division〔９〕, where some comrades find it hard to imagine that a revolutionary upsurge is imminent.
However, China is precisely such a country: even after ten years of civil war had left the Jiangxi Soviet Region nearly abandoned, a revolutionary upsurge still came about—truly, when the South grows dark, the North draws near.


The reason for the leftward shift in Europe lies in the fact that middle-class and petty-bourgeois elements in several European countries are increasingly losing their savings and being reduced to the ranks of the proletariat.
The same holds true in China: life under Kuomintang rule is even more difficult than during the War of Resistance. Therefore, the Chinese people have no choice but to rise up in revolution.


Ta Kung Pao, a bourgeois newspaper that supports Chiang Kai-shek yet maintains certain differences with him, has proposed three possible futures for China: first, a path of political consultation; second, a divided north-south scenario; and third, a trajectory akin to the October Revolution. Notably, it makes no mention of a future in which Chiang reunifies China.
No centrist newspaper has suggested that Chiang could unify the nation, nor has any Kuomintang publication failed to acknowledge that democracy offers the only viable path forward.


By emphasizing that a revolutionary upsurge is bound to occur, we enable the entire Party to understand this reality and make preparations—ideologically, operationally, and organizationally—so that we may secure victory in this upcoming upsurge.


The United States’ policy toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime (analogous to Britain’s policy toward Greece〔１０〕) was difficult for us to assess last year, but we can now determine it with certainty.


Our current slogan is not yet “Down with the U.S.-Kuomintang alliance,” though in practice we are indeed aiming to overthrow them.


Will there ever be a chance for peace? Our document does not preclude the possibility of peace, nor does it reject negotiations with the Kuomintang. However, it is clear that the United States seeks joint rule over China alongside Chiang Kai-shek, that Chiang intends to establish a dictatorial regime, and that the people are determined to oppose both imperialism and feudalism. These three points are beyond dispute.


Why might peace still be possible? If we were to eliminate another fifty brigades of Chiang’s army, he would urgently need a respite before resuming hostilities.


As for us, we would need to assess the momentum of the upsurge and our own human and material resources. Should we also require a break to continue our offensive, we could engage in negotiations with him at that time.


Under such circumstances, a truce lasting six months to a year would be feasible. This truce would serve merely as a temporary measure and would not touch upon any fundamental principles.


The so-called fundamental principles refer to opposing imperialism and feudalism.


We adopt this step to safeguard the success of the revolution.


During last year’s ceasefire, our Fifth Division and the Jiangnan region suffered losses: troops were depleted, and the civilian population endured severe hardships.


Nevertheless, such ceasefires are necessary, both militarily and politically. Without a pause then, there would have been no justification; Chiang Kai-shek saw it the same way, as did the United States, leading to that brief cessation of hostilities.


Ceasefires of this nature may occur again in the future; hence, our document does not rule out the possibility of peace.


With regard to land issues in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the Northwest Bureau and the Border Region Government should continue working to ensure that all landless peasants receive land. In areas where land has already been distributed, if the majority remain without plots while only a small minority have received them, a redistribution should be considered, as this would garner broader popular support.


Peasants ought to openly confront landlords rather than maintain a superficially amicable relationship. It is counterproductive to strike at landlords only to then seek reconciliation; mere conciliation without firm action will not suffice.


There exists a group of cadres who, in practice, side with the landlords, and they must undergo re-education. Command headquarters, special administrative offices, and local party committees should all align ideologically with the peasant masses.


Our failure to provide such education in the past constitutes a shortcoming in our work; these cadres often fear violating official policy.


Regarding the united front, the document describes it as extremely broad. We might add that the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party〔１１〕 siding with Chiang Kai-shek does not indicate our isolation, but rather reflects Chiang’s increasing isolation. The fact that he feels compelled to court these smaller parties and rely on them to prop up his position actually underscores the breadth of our united front.


Similar developments will likely occur in the future, as the strength of the people continues to grow.


Our stance toward Chiang Kai-shek today differs somewhat from that during the War of Resistance, yet it is not a principled difference. During the war, we too engaged in extensive struggle while making few concessions.


The large landowners and big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek played a limited role in the Anti-Fascist War, while their disruptive influence was considerable.


During the War of Resistance, our policy toward Chiang was to place a noose around his neck and pull him along with us.


Chiang pursued a policy of passive resistance against Japan and active suppression of communism, attacking us wherever possible. Had we not resisted decisively and made adequate preparations, the current situation would never have come to pass.


Our principal allies in the War of Resistance were the peasants, followed by the national bourgeoisie.


Chiang’s role in the war was far less significant than that of Churchill〔１２〕 in Britain’s fight against Nazi Germany.


It is appropriate to address land issues now. Starting last year or this year would not be considered late; however, failing to resolve them promptly and continuing to delay would constitute a grave mistake.


Why not abolish the “three-thirds system”〔１３〕, which remains in place? Because the current conditions in the liberated areas are essentially the same as those in the base areas where democratic reforms had already been thoroughly implemented during the War of Resistance. Therefore, centrist elements and non-Party progressives should still be incorporated into the government.


Some comrades believe that the “three-thirds system” can be dispensed with, but this view is unwarranted.


In areas where land reform has progressed deeply, if the landlords have already yielded, giving them one final push would still benefit us.


In summary, this revolutionary upsurge differs from the previous three. Unlike the first, it is led by our Party; unlike the second and third, the Kuomintang does not participate in the leadership.


Attempts to share leadership responsibilities have consistently proven unsuccessful.


During the civil war, we did not occupy major cities, nor did the national bourgeoisie take part. This time, however, the situation is different.


There remains a considerable amount of time before the revolution’s ultimate victory. As I have previously stated, this could take anywhere from three to five years, or even ten to fifteen years.


If we consider a timeframe of three to five years, then roughly half of that period—about a year and a half—has already passed since Japan’s surrender. Nevertheless, we must still anticipate the remaining challenges ahead.


This document should be widely disseminated within the Party.


Printed based on the transcript of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.


Notes 〔１〕 This is Mao Zedong’s speech delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, during discussions on the Party directive “Welcoming a New High Tide in the Chinese Revolution.” The directive appears on pages 1211–1217 of Volume Four of Selected Works of Mao Zedong (People’s Publishing House, 1991 edition).
〔２〕 Refers to the article “Welcoming a New High Tide in the Chinese Revolution.”
〔３〕 The May Thirtieth Movement refers to the anti-imperialist patriotic movement that erupted on May 30, 1925. In February and April of the same year, tens of thousands of workers at Japanese-owned textile mills in Shanghai and Qingdao went on strike successively, achieving significant victories. The rising tide of the workers’ movement sparked panic and hostility among imperialists, prompting them to intensify efforts to suppress it. On May 15, Japanese capitalists at the No. 7 Cotton Mill in Shanghai shot and killed Gu ZhengHong, a worker leader and member of the Communist Party, injuring more than ten others. On May 30, when over two thousand students staged demonstrations on various streets in the International Settlement, more than a hundred were arrested by the police, further inflaming student and citizen outrage. Nearly ten thousand people gathered outside the police station, demanding the release of the detained students. British police opened fire on the crowd, killing and wounding many. Following the “May Thirtieth” massacre, public indignation swept across the country. Workers, students, and some merchants organized marches, demonstrations, strikes, and school boycotts in numerous cities and counties, forming a nationwide anti-imperialist patriotic movement.
〔４〕 The Tongmenghui was the abbreviated name of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance, a bourgeois revolutionary party. In August 1905, members of the Revive China Society and the Huaxing Society, among other revolutionary groups, joined forces in Tokyo, Japan, to form the Alliance, adopting Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary platform of “expelling the Tartars, restoring China, establishing a republic, and ensuring equal rights to land.” Sun Yat-sen was elected as the Alliance’s president. Under his leadership, the Alliance actively propagated revolutionary ideas and coordinated with various factions and the New Army to launch multiple armed uprisings. In October 1911, the Wuchang Uprising broke out, quickly evolving into the Xinhai Revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty. After Yuan Shikai seized power, the Alliance was reorganized into the Kuomintang in August 1912.
〔５〕 The Sino-U.S. Commercial Treaty refers to the “Sino-U.S. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation.” See note 6 on page 201 of this volume.
〔６〕 Wang Jingwei served as Vice Chairman of the Supreme National Defense Council of the Kuomintang after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, advocating for compromise with Japan and becoming a leading pro-Japanese figure within the party. In March 1938, he was appointed Vice President of the Kuomintang, and in December of the same year publicly surrendered to Japan, subsequently serving as Chairman of the puppet Nanjing government installed by the Japanese.
〔７〕 See “Welcoming a New High Tide in the Chinese Revolution” (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume Four, People’s Publishing House, 1991 edition, pp. 1212–1213).
〔８〕 Refers to Germany, Italy, and Japan.
〔９〕 The Fifth Division refers to the former Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, commanded by Li Xiannian, who also served as its political commissar.
〔１０〕 In April 1941, German fascists occupied Greece. Some Greek government officials and military officers, led by the king, fled abroad and established a government-in-exile, while the people inside Greece, under the leadership of the Greek Communist Party, vigorously fought against fascism. By April 1942, the Greek People’s Liberation Army had been formed, and by March 1944, the Greek National Political Committee had been established to exercise the functions of a people’s government. At that point, the People’s Liberation Army had already liberated numerous cities and vast stretches of territory by annihilating large numbers of enemy forces. The Liberation Army’s successes greatly alarmed the Greek government-in-exile and caused serious concern in Britain. To keep Greece within its sphere of influence, Britain supported pro-British forces to remain in power, orchestrating a deception under the guise of mediating relations between the government-in-exile and the National Political Committee, ultimately creating a unified Greek government and a unified Greek army. Subsequently, Britain openly intervened militarily. Under Britain’s political deception and military interference, the National Political Committee announced its dissolution in September 1944, relinquishing the authority it had held in the liberated areas. In January 1945, the People’s Liberation Army was also disbanded, and its weapons were turned over. After laying down their arms, the revolutionary fighters and civilians were subjected to brutal persecution by both the British and Greek governments.
〔１１〕 The Youth Party, officially known as the Chinese Youth Party, was founded in 1923. The Democratic Socialist Party, formally the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party, was formed in August 1946 through the merger of the National Social Party and the Democratic Constitutional Party. During the War of Resistance, both parties were members of the Chinese Democratic League and later became closely aligned with the Kuomintang. In November 1946, they participated in the Kuomintang-sponsored “National Assembly,” endorsing the so-called “Constitution of the Republic of China” adopted at that assembly and supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s subsequent launch of a civil war aimed at suppressing the people and communism.
〔１２〕 Churchill served as Prime Minister of the British War Coalition Cabinet from 1940 to 1945, leading Britain’s resistance against Nazi Germany.
〔１３〕 The “three-thirds system” was a policy formulated and implemented by the Communist Party of China concerning the establishment of government bodies in anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines. According to this policy, personnel in such governments were allocated as follows: approximately one-third communists, approximately one-third leftist progressives, and approximately one-third centrists and other elements.