On January 18, 1947, an instruction was issued stating that the offensive to be directly commanded by Chen Cheng would be launched shortly. It appeared advantageous for our forces to wait until the enemy launched its attack before counterattacking: first, it would allow our troops sufficient time to rest and reorganize; second, we could strike when the enemy had not yet established a firm foothold; and third, we could conduct successive operations to annihilate a large number of the enemy. However, if the timing of the enemy’s offensive were delayed until late January or early March, our forces should not wait too long. On January 31, 1947, another instruction indicated that Chiang Kai-shek’s army was about to launch an offensive within days, which seemed highly conducive to our inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy in open-field engagements. Our operational policy should therefore focus on luring the enemy deeper into our territory, rather than initiating action prematurely. In summary, a comprehensive plan must be formulated for this campaign. The main forces in Jiaodong and central Shandong are to be swiftly moved south of the Jiaoji Railway to lie in wait and destroy the enemy, thereby countering the enemy’s planned pincer movement from north and south.
Oo Lai Zongzhan Investment Data Selection, Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1981.9