Ideas on How to Smash Chen Cheng’s
Attack Plan
(January 28, 1947)
To Chen [Yi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin]:1
Have you heard the news that the offensive under the direct command of Chen
Cheng2 will begin soon? His troops for this offensive will come from among the
more than twenty brigades along the Xuhai and Xulin railways.3 It seems that the
number of brigades to be used at the front will not exceed eighteen, of which only
six are relatively strong. Do you think that Chen Cheng will have to wait until
troops have been transferred from other places before he can actually launch an
offensive? If it is true that Chen Cheng’s offensive will not begin until early or
mid-February, it seems better for us to wait until after his offensive has begun.
First, our troops will have more time to rest and reorganize; second, we can strike
the enemy before it has settled down; third, we can fight continually and wipe
out more of the enemy. But if the enemy postpones its offensive until the end
of February or early March, it will not be advantageous for us to wait too long.
Moreover, how strong are the fortifications built by the Twenty-fifth and Sixty-fifth divisions? Do you think it would not be difficult to wipe out these two divisions? In addition, when you attack these two divisions, the Seventy-fourth and
Eighty-third divisions will come to their aid. It is possible that after wiping out
these two divisions you will be able to proceed to wipe out part or the greater
part of the Seventy-fourth and Eighty-fourth divisions in successive campaigns. If
so, Chen Cheng’s plan for an offensive will be completely destroyed. Thereafter,
we will attack Feng Zhi’an, Hu Lian,4 the Sixty-fourth Division, and the Twentieth
Division one by one based on positional warfare. You must also take this possibility into consideration. Please inform us by telegram of your opinions.
The Military Commission
Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 643–44, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, Su Yu was
deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar.

2.  Chen Cheng was chief-of-staff of the Guomindang army.

3.  This refers to the railway lines from Xuzhou to Haizhou (now Lianyungang city
in Jiangsu Province), and from Xuzhou to Lincheng (now Xuecheng in Zhaozhuang city,
Shandong Province).
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-268


4.  Feng Zhi’an was commander of the Guomindang army’s Third Pacification Zone
and commander of the Reorganized Thirty-third Army. Hu Lian was commander of the
Guomindang army’s Reorganized Eleventh Division.