Lin, Gao, and Peng [1]: (1) Recently, victories have begun to be won in North Manchuria and East Manchuria [2], which is most gratifying.
The encirclement of Qitamu prompted unplanned reinforcements from Jintai, Jilin, and Dehui; all such reinforcements were either annihilated or routed by our forces [3].
This experience demonstrates that the “encircle the city and defeat the relieving force” tactic is one of the important methods for destroying the enemy.
It is highly necessary to take advantage of the freezing season to launch planned offensives, to seek out the enemy’s weak points on a widespread basis, to employ the “encircle the city and defeat the relieving force” method, to destroy large numbers of the enemy, and thereby to reverse the balance of power between ourselves and the enemy.


(2) The experience gained during twenty days of operations behind enemy lines by the Fourth Column in South Manchuria [4] also shows that only by adopting a bold offensive posture can we achieve victory over the enemy.
They must be even bolder, daring to attack and annihilate enemy garrisons of one or two battalions, and each time they must be fully prepared to engage any relieving forces that may arrive.


(3) On several major battlefields within China, our forces have begun to seize the initiative and are increasingly developing into large-scale annihilation battles.
A substantial portion of Chiang Kai-shek’s main striking power—Xue Yue [5] commanding eighty brigades, Gu Zhutong [6] thirty brigades, and Hu Zongnan [7] twenty-four brigades, totaling 134 brigades—has been destroyed.
Nationwide, over a period of six months and ten days, we have already annihilated fifty-one regular enemy brigades. By July of this year, it may be possible to destroy around one hundred brigades, fundamentally altering the balance of power between us and the enemy.
Under these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek will be compelled to commit all his available strength to the battlefields along the Longhai Railway line and will be unable to reinforce Northeast China. If you can, by every means at your disposal, weaken Du Yuming’s [8] existing forces—five armies comprising fifteen divisions, together with specialized arms and security units—for example, by destroying an average of more than one division per month (equivalent to the rate achieved in inland China), thus eliminating over twelve divisions within a year, you will be able to shift the strategic situation to your advantage.
By continuing along these lines for two or three years—since the enemy can replenish its losses—you will be able to fundamentally transform the overall military situation and establish a solid base area.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript under the direction of the Military Commission’s Zi Zhen.


Notes: [1] Lin refers to Lin Biao, who at the time served as Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army.
Gao and Peng refer to Gao Gang and Peng Zhen, both of whom held the post of Deputy Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army at the time.
[2] Refers to the North Manchuria Military Region and the East Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic United Army.
[3] In January 1947, in coordination with operations in South Manchuria, a detachment of the Northeast Democratic United Army’s North Manchuria forces encircled the key position of Qitamu north of Jilin, while the main body simultaneously annihilated enemy reinforcements arriving from Jintai and Dehui at Zhangmazigou and Jiaojialing. Subsequently, capitalizing on their momentum, they captured and destroyed the forces at Qitamu, wiping out two regiments of the Nationalist army’s New First Army and a portion of a security regiment.
[4] Refers to the South Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic United Army.
[5] Xue Yue was then Director of the Xuzhou Pacification Office of the Nationalist Army.
[6] Gu Zhutong was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s General Staff Headquarters.
[7] Hu Zongnan was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s First War Area.
[8] Du Yuming was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Northeast Security Command.