Concentrate the Main Forces in South Manchuria to Destroy the Enemy and Delay the Enemy’s Attack on North Manchuria[1]

(December 13, 1946)

Lin, and inform the Northeast Bureau:

Your telegram of the 7th[2] has been noted. Under the present circumstances, temporarily adopting a defensive posture, striving to delay the enemy’s attack on North Manchuria[3], and making preparations to meet the enemy’s offensive deployment is quite appropriate. In South Manchuria[4], the main forces should be concentrated to destroy the enemy one by one and recover lost territory, which will certainly help delay the enemy’s attack on North Manchuria.

The Military Commission

December 13

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Lin Biao, Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army, and for the information of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. In order to disrupt the Kuomintang army’s plan of “first south, then north” and destroying our forces one by one, and to compel it to fight on two fronts, the headquarters of the Northeast Democratic United Army adopted the policy of holding firm in South Manchuria, consolidating North Manchuria, fighting in the south to draw enemy forces north, fighting in the north to draw enemy forces south, close coordination between north and south, concentrating superior forces, and actively striking the enemy. From mid-December 1946, operations known as “Three Crossings of the Songhua River and Four Defenses of Linjiang” were launched against the enemy on both the South and North Manchurian fronts over a period of three and a half months.

[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao to the CPC Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau on December 7, 1946. The telegram stated: Our main forces have been in the area northwest of Nong’an for over 20 days, only able to fight minor engagements and threaten the entire enemy force attacking South Manchuria, but unable to develop the war situation. The enemy is currently concentrating its forces along the line from Nong’an to Changling, with the main purpose appearing to be defensive; their future intentions are still difficult to judge. Our army is striving to delay the enemy’s attack on North Manchuria, while concentrating the main forces north of the Songhua River to prepare to meet the enemy’s offensive, and also sending a part westward to pin down the enemy’s northward advance and seek minor engagements.

[3] North Manchuria refers to the areas including Harbin, Mudanjiang, Bei’an, Jiamusi, Qiqihar, etc.

[4] South Manchuria refers to the areas east of the Shenyang-Dalian section of the Chinese Changchun Railway, including Andong (now Dandong), Zhuanghe, Tonghua, Linjiang, Qingyuan, and the Liaozhong area southwest of Shenyang. Here, South Manchuria refers to the South Manchuria Military District of the Northeast Democratic United Army.

Photograph

Winter 1946, Mao Zedong in Yan’an.