Winning Requires Successfully Forming a
United Front1
(November 21, 1946)
We already predicted at the time of the Party’s Seventh National Congress that
after the capitulation of Japan, if we could not overcome the conspiracy of Chiang
Kaishek and the danger of a Chinese Scobie,2 a civil war in China could not be
avoided. Chiang Kaishek seemed to change a little bit this January and February,3
but subsequent events have demonstrated that the prediction of the Party’s
Seventh Congress was correct after all. The world had previously witnessed the
conflict between fascism and anti-fascism. After the war, this was replaced by a
world marked by confrontation between the American reactionaries and the people of the world, and this confrontation was also reflected in China, where Chiang
Kaishek, with the support of the United States, launched a civil war against the
people. The struggle in China is therefore intimately linked to world events. In
recent times, the question of whether there might be a civil war has arisen among
both the Chinese people and within our Party, and everyone has hoped there would
be no fighting between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But now the
question has been resolved. For example, this time the people have far fewer illusions about Chiang’s ceasefire order, as shown by the reaction in Shanghai and
elsewhere. The question remains whether we can win. This is like the situation at the beginning of the global struggle against fascism when people worried whether
it would be possible to defeat Japan and Hitler. Now many people hope that we
will be victorious, but at the same time many people fear we will not be victorious
because we have lost places such as Changchun, Zhangjiakou, and now perhaps
Yan’an, Yantai, and others. As a result, the problem of exposing Chiang’s scheme
to launch a civil war and of dissipating any illusions about peace has become of
secondary importance. Our priority is to publicize the fact that conditions exist for
us to win and to build up firm confidence in a victory. We have been doing this
work for the past several months and will continue doing it in the future. If we
want to win, we must succeed in establishing a united front, which means increasing our numbers and isolating the enemy. Of course, the enemy also intends to
isolate us, but the enemy itself is the only one who will be isolated. With respect
to the international situation, there too we cannot be isolated. At present, there are
three zones in the world: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the intermediate
zone between them.4 The people of all three zones oppose the American reactionaries. Today’s world is characterized by confrontation and conflict between
American imperialism and the people of the whole world. Several months ago,
we told American journalists that American policy was wrong, but they would
not believe it and they tried to defend it. Now they no longer defend it. When
they come to Yan’an, they only ask why we do not criticize the Soviet Union. The
people in the United States may also undergo a change, rise up, and oppose the
American reactionaries. The foundation of the United States is in an extremely
perilous condition. It is not like Danbazhaizi in Bao’an5 in the past, which would
not have faced a crisis if you had not attacked it. A crisis in the United States is
going to occur, and it will be much more serious than in the past. The American
imperialists are outwardly strong but inwardly weak, like Chiang Kaishek, and
they can be overthrown. Were not both Napoleon and Hitler overthrown in the
end? We say that the Chinese and American reactionaries are outwardly strong
but inwardly weak, so we must despise them. This is not merely to boost our own
morale, but it is also based on fact. In short, the world is making progress, the
Soviet Union is developing, and the United States is facing a crisis. The principal
contradiction today is between the United States and the other countries in the
capitalist world, that is, between the United States and the intermediate zone. We
are not isolated, and our united front is broad. If we can manage to survive the
next year, things will become better in the following year.
Chiang Kaishek’s basic orientation toward us is, first, not to give us freedom,
and second, to eliminate us. He is unwilling to allow us to retain any territory at all
according to the conditions of the treaty he seeks to impose on us. Our basic orientation therefore must be to fight, and this has already been established. Compared
to the first period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our conditions are
somewhat better, and the united front is broader. We have asked all the people
returning from Shanghai and Beiping, “Was the united front during the War of
Resistance Against Japan broader, or is today’s united front broader?” Some of
our comrades were ignored at the beginning of the War of Resistance Against
Japan, but now the situation is different. Many people would like to have a word
with our comrades, saying our policy is all right, and they only ask whether it will
change in the future. In the Liberated Areas, is our united front narrower than it
was during the War of Resistance Against Japan? It is almost the same. Carrying
out land reform will not affect our uniting with the landlords, just like rent and
interest reductions during the War of Resistance, even though they caused some
losses to the landlords, it did not prevent us from uniting with them. After completion of land reform, we can win them over next year by showing consideration for
their livelihood and allowing them, like the peasants and in accordance with our
experience in Yan’an, to engage in production. At present, only one-tenth of the
landlords in southern Shaanxi, western Hubei, and western Henan are against us,
and nine-tenths are neutral or willing to help us. The united front is a fundamental
issue, and no matter what, we must unite with the vast majority of the people.
Provided only that we do not adopt a closed-door policy, Chiang Kaishek cannot
isolate us. Look at the second article of the Sino-American Trade Treaty.6 How
can Chiang Kaishek not be isolated? If he is isolated, we will be victorious.
Militarily, Chiang Kaishek launched an all-out civil war almost five months
ago. We have so far wiped out thirty-eight enemy brigades, a little more than half
of the seventy-five [that we plan to destroy]. It is difficult to imagine that we are
not going to destroy any more of them in the future. The armies of Yan Xishan
and Gu Zhutong7 in their two regions are already unable to attack, and at present,
Cheng Qian8 does not have the strength to attack either. The campaign launched by Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]9 can be described as our counterattack,
since we attacked them while they were passive everywhere. Gu Zhutong will find
it very difficult to attack again without a transfer of troops from Hu Zongnan.10 It
is possible that he may benefit from the transfer of the Eleventh Army from Xue
Yue11 or of the troops from Hu Zongnan to participate in the fighting, and in that
case the siege of Yan’an will have to be raised. If Gu Zhutong is unable to attack,
we will attack him. We will still use the method of a surprise attack, assembling
a superior force to eliminate the enemy. At present, the Guomindang may still
have the strength to attack Yan’an, Lianshui, Linyi, and Yantai, and to launch
some attacks in Shanxi, Chahar, Hebei, and the Northeast, but the others are not
in much danger. If we do not analyze the enemy’s strategy, it will be like the
time when Cao, during the period of the Three Kingdoms, claimed he had a force
of 830,000, causing a heated debate in the Kingdom of Eastern Wu.12 Chiang
Kaishek’s attack can be smashed, eliminating seventy to eighty of his brigades in
six to twelve months. When his attack has been halted, we can begin our counterattack and crush his forces, which have accumulated during the last seven or
eight years with American assistance, thus creating a balance of power between
the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Once we have achieved a balance, it
will be easy to surpass him. At that time, we can break out, first to Anhui, Henan,
Hubei, and Gansu, and then south of the Yangzi. This will take approximately
three to five years. Of course, we cannot say that by that time we will be able to
wipe out Chiang Kaishek. We prefer to make a somewhat more conservative estimate, but at the very worst, we will fight no more than fifteen years. And we might
end up without a single county town on our side. We must prepare for this too. In
1941 and 1942 we occupied very few county towns. Now we have lost only a few
more than 170 of the 499 that we originally occupied.
Solving the land problem is the foundation of all our work. The spring plowing next year will be the first created on the new basis by land reform. Everything
should be calculated based on the assumption of a protracted war.
The delegation has engaged in negotiations for a year and it has done its work
well. The main purpose of the negotiations is to educate the people, and this has been achieved. The delegation cannot return early; it can only return after
the National Assembly convenes.13 Only in this way can the responsibilities for
war and division be clarified, and the confidence of the people be maintained.
When the fighting begins, we will lose if the hearts of the people are not with
us. Educating the people has always been a task of our Party, and we should persevere in it. Now the people have finally come to know who wants to fight and
who wants peace; the people have also become clearer about the deception by the
American government. Our Party itself also needs to be educated; there is also a
process of education. We suffered losses in demobilization and as a result, some
of our forces are not adequate and the militia has also been reduced.
Shall we adopt the slogan, “Down with Chiang Kaishek”? We must do the
work, but not put forward the slogan. Our slogan is still restoration of the positions
when the ceasefire agreement came into effect on January 13th and implementation of the decision of the People’s Political Conference. We must consider that if
we keep on fighting against Chiang Kaishek, after we eliminate his seventy-five
brigades, the United States may again increase its support and new difficulties will
then arise. Therefore, on the one hand, we must despise them, since we cannot
otherwise boost our morale and dampen the enemy’s spirit; but, on the other hand,
we must take the enemy seriously, be careful and accurate in each battle, and
not be careless. When shall we return to negotiations? It is a faulty strategy for
Chiang Kaishek to convene a “National Assembly.” He wants to strengthen himself, but instead he will weaken himself. He has, however, promised in advance
that the “constitution”14 can still be changed within six months. If we eliminate
his seventy-five brigades, by that time he will “love peace” again. He may want
to negotiate again, and we will not be able to refuse. There will be many tiresome
issues. In sum, this is a long-term struggle, and there will be many twists and turns
in the course of it. This is not caused exclusively by Chiang Kaishek’s side. The
principal factor is interference by the imperialists.
The split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party this time is different from that in 1927. We were completely passive at that time, while this
time we are prepared. The cadres are clear about the future, and the masses also
understand it.

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 196–202, where it is reproduced from a stenographic record of the speech preserved in the Central Archives.
7.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Second War Zone. Gu
Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s army’s General Headquarters and
director of the Zhengzhou Pacification Office.
8.  Cheng Qian was director of the Wuhan Field Headquarters for the Guomindang’s
Military Affairs Commission.
9.  This refers to the Huaxian Campaign from November 18 to November 22, 1946,
during which the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army led by Liu
Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping carried out long-distance raiding tactics and annihilated a
total of 12,000 troops of the Guomindang army’s Twelfth Column, 104th Brigade, and parts
of the 125th Brigade. This destroyed the Guomindang’s plans to control the southwestern
parts of Shandong and opened up the Beiping-Hankou railway.
10.  Hu Zongnan was deputy director of the Guomindang army’s Zhengzhou Pacification Office as well as commander of its First War Zone.
11.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou Pacification Office.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong made this speech during a meeting of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party.

2.  Ronald Scobie (1893–1969) was commander of the British armed forces stationed
in Greece after World War II. After the invading German army was defeated in Greece
in October 1944, Scobie brought the Greek government-in-exile with him from London
to enter Greece together with the British forces and he assisted the Greek government in
attacking the Greek People’s Liberation Army.

3.  On January 10, 1946, the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang formally
promulgated a ceasefire agreement. On the same day, the Political Consultative Conference
was convened in Chongqing, and it passed the “Outline for Peaceful Construction of the
Nation” and four other motions related to government organization, the national congress,
the drafting of the constitution, and military affairs. On February 25, the Communists
and the Guomindang concluded the “Basic Proposal Regarding the Reorganization of the
Armed Forces and Incorporation of the Communist Forces into the Guomindang Army.” It
was not long thereafter before each of these agreements collapsed.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-247

4.  Eds.: The Theory of Intermediate Zones was first articulated by Mao Zedong in an
interview with American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The intermediate
zone refers to the vast area lying between the United States and the Soviet Union.

5.  Bao’an refers to today’s Zhidan county in Shaanxi Province. Danbazhaizi was a village in southwestern Bao’an with 200 or more families, strategically situated and easy to
defend. The Red Army besieged the village many times without capturing it, but finally in
August 1936 the Red Army used the local militia to encircle the village and in December
1936 it was liberated.

6.  The Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation signed by the
Guomindang and American governments on November 4, 1946, consisted of thirty articles.
The primary content of the second article granted Americans the right to reside and travel
in all internal territories of China; to pursue employment in commerce, manufacturing,
production, science, religion, charitable enterprises, and all other jobs not set aside specifically for Chinese; and to rent and lease land. Americans were granted the same economic
rights as Chinese, and equal treatment to that of any other third-party country in China.

12.  In this story from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Cao Cao led an immense
army south to attack Eastern Wu. The military and civilian leaders of Eastern Wu disagreed
over whether to surrender or to fight.

13.  The National Assembly convened by the Guomindang government in 1946 agreed
to convene again in accordance with the Political Consultative Conference’s January 1946
resolution, but only if the reorganized government allowed for participation by all parties.
In the meantime, the civil war was launched and the Guomindang convened the National
Assembly from November 15 to December 25 with additional participation by the Youth
Party, the Democratic Society Party, and other small parties. The Chinese Communist Party
and other parties and organizations refused to participate in or to recognize this National
Assembly.

14.  This refers to the constitution passed during the National Assembly held from
November 15 to December 25, 1946.