Combat Inside the Passes Is Approaching a Turning Point, Which Is Favorable for Operations in the Northeast[1]

(November 1, 1946)

Lin, Peng, Gao, Chen:

(1) Your telegram of the 31st [of October][2] received. Your operational plan is very good; resolutely carry it out. (2) Combat inside the passes is approaching a turning point. Chiang’s offensive strength is nearly exhausted. If we can annihilate a dozen or so enemy brigades in the months of November and December, we can halt the enemy offensive, and we can begin to shift to the strategic counteroffensive and recover lost territory. This will certainly pin down the Chiang army and make it unable to send reinforcements to the Northeast, which will be favorable for your execution of the new operational plan. (3) Our Su-Yu [Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin][3] army has annihilated another brigade of the enemy’s 28th Division south of Lianshui and is continuing its attacks on the 74th Division. The Liu-Deng [Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping] army has annihilated one brigade of the 68th Division and is continuing its attacks on another brigade.

The Central Committee

November 1

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to Lin Biao, commander and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army, and its deputy political commissars Peng Zhen, Gao Gang, and Chen Yun.

[2] Refers to the telegram of October 31, 1946, from Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Gao Gang, and Chen Yun to the Central Committee of the CPC, with copies to Xiao Hua, Cheng Zihua, Cheng Shicai, and Luo Shunchu. The telegram stated: The enemy is using the Songhua River to block our North Manchuria forces while concentrating its main force to attack South Manchuria and West Manchuria. It is currently deploying to attack Taonan, but enemy strength north of Changchun is relatively weak. We plan to use five divisions, transport them by rail from Harbin via Qiqihar around to south of the Songhua River, then march on foot to launch an offensive and annihilate the enemy, in order to disrupt the enemy’s attack on Taonan, coordinate with South Manchuria, and disrupt the enemy’s plan to attack Harbin.

[3] Su-Yu refers to Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, who were then respectively commander and political commissar of the Central China Field Army.