October 1, 1946

[This inner-Party directive was drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China. It summed up in detail the series
of experiences in the three months of fighting beginning with the outbreak
of the country-wide civil war in July 1946, set forth the strategy and fighting
tasks of the People's Liberation Army from then on and pointed out that after
overcoming a period of difficulties we were certain to win victory in the
People's War of Liberation. The directive also explained in principle the
problems which needed to be solved for the support of and in co-ordination
with the People's War of Liberation, such as land reform, the development
of production in the Liberated Areas, the strengthening of leadership in
the mass struggles in the Kuomintang areas and other relevant problems. ]


1. The Central Committee's directive of situation
[1] stated: "We can defeat Chiang Kai-shek. The
whole Party should be fully confident of this." The fighting in July, August
and September has proved this judgement to be correct.

2. Apart from the fundamental political and economic contradictions which
Chiang Kai-shek cannot resolve and which are the basic cause rendering our
victory certain and Chiang's defeat inevitable, a sharp contradiction has
arisen in the military sphere between Chiang's over-extended battle lines
and his shortage of troops. That contradiction is bound to be the direct
cause of our victory and Chiang Kai-shek's defeat.

3. The total of Chiang Kai-shek's regular troops attacking the Liberated
Areas, not counting the puppet troops, the peace preservation corps and
communications police corps, is more than 190 brigades. Besides this total,
the most he can do is again to move part of his troops from the south to
the north as reinforcements; but after that it will be hard for him to send
any more reinforcements. Of the 190 odd brigades, 25 have been wiped out
by our army in the past three months. This does not include the forces we
wiped out in the Northeast from February to June this year.

4. Of Chiang Kai-shek's more than 190 brigades, nearly half must perform
garrison duties; only a little more than half can be put into the field.
And when these field forces advance to certain regions, part or even a majority
will have to switch over to garrison duty. The enemy's field forces are bound
to dwindle as the fighting goes on because, first, they will be continually
wiped out by us and, second, many will have to perform garrison duties.

5. Of the 25 brigades we destroyed in the past three months, 7 were under
the command of Tang En-po (previously under Li Mo-an), 2 under Hsueh Yueh,
7 under Ku Chu-tung (previously under Liu Chih), 2 under Hu Tsung-nan, 4
under Yen Hsi-shan, 2 under Wang Yao-wu and 1 under Tu Yu-ming. Only the
4 groups under Li Tsung-jen, Fu Tso-yi, Ma Hung-kuei and Cheng Chien have
not yet received crushing blows from our army; all the remaining 7 groups
have received serious blows or initial blows. Those who have received serious
blows are Tu Yu-ming (taking into account the fighting in the Northeast from
February to June this year), Tang En-po, Ku Chutung and Yen Hsi-shan. Those
who have received initial blows are Hsueh Yueh, Hu Tsung-nan and Wang Yao-wu.
All this proves that our army can defeat Chiang Kai-shek.

6. In the coming period our task is to wipe out some 25 more enemy brigades.
The completion of this task will make it possible to halt Chiang Kai-shek's
offensive and recover part of our lost territory. It can be predicted that
after wiping out this second batch of 25 brigades our army will certainly
be able to seize the strategic initiative and go over from the defensive
to the offensive. Our task then will be to destroy a third batch of 25 enemy
brigades. If we achieve that, we can recover most or even all of the lost
territory and expand the Liberated Areas. By that time a tremendous change
will surely have taken place in the relative military strength of the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party. To attain this we must follow up our great achievement
of wiping out 25 brigades in the past three months and destroy about 25 more
in the coming three months or so. This is the key to changing the situation
as between the enemy and ourselves.[2]

7. In the past three months we have lost a few dozen medium and small towns,
such as Huaiyin, Hotse, Chengteh and Chining. The abandonment of most of
these towns was unavoidable and it was right to abandon them temporarily
on our own initiative. Some others we were forced to abandon because we did
not fight well. In any case, we shall be able to recover our lost territory,
provided we fight well from now on. In the future there may still be places
we cannot prevent the enemy from taking, but we shall be able to recover
all of them later. All areas should critically review their past experience
in fighting in order to draw lessons and avoid repeating mistakes.

8. In the past three months our Central Plains Liberation Army has shown
matchless stamina in overcoming difficulties and hardships and, aside from
that part of the army which has moved into the old Liberated Areas, its main
force has established two guerrilla bases in southern Shensi and western
Hupeh.[3] Moreover, in both eastern and central
Hupeh our troops are persisting in guerrilla warfare. All this has greatly
helped, and is still helping, the fighting in the old Liberated Areas, and
it will play a greater role in the long war ahead.

9. In the past three months of war we have pinned down south of the Great
Wall several of Chiang Kai-shek's crack forces, which he had originally planned
to send to the Northeast, and have thus gained time for resting and consolidating
our troops and for arousing the masses in the Northeast. This, too, is of
great significance for our future struggles.

10. To concentrate a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one
is the only correct method of fighting, the method we have used in the past
three months to destroy 25 enemy brigades. Only by concentrating a force
six, five, four or at least three times as strong as the enemy's force can
we be effective in wiping it out. This must be done both in campaigns and
in battles. This method of fighting must be mastered not only by all high-ranking
commanders but also by all middle and lower-ranking cadres.

11. In the past three months, in addition to 25 regular brigades of the enemy,
our army has destroyed considerable numbers of reactionary forces, such as
puppet troops, peace preservation corps and communications police corps;
this also is a great achievement. We should continue to annihilate such troops
in large numbers.

12. The experience of the past three months has proved that in order to wipe
out 10,000 enemy troops we have to pay a price of 2,000 to 3,000 casualties
of our own. This is unavoidable. To cope with a long war (and everything,
everywhere should be considered with such a war in mind) we must expand our
army in a planned way, ensure that our main forces are always kept at full
strength and train large numbers of military cadres. We must develop production
and regulate finances according to plan and firmly put into effect the principles
of developing our economy and ensuring supply, of unified leadership and
decentralized management and of giving consideration to both the army and
the people and to both public and private interests.

13. The experience of these three months has proved that higher fighting
efficiency was shown by all troops who, during the period of the truce from
January to June, intensified their military training according to the directives
of the Central Committee (which has repeatedly instructed the various areas
to regard troop training, production and land reform as their three central
tasks). It has also proved that all troops not so trained showed much lower
fighting efficiency. From now on, all areas must utilize the intervals between
battles for intensified military training. All army units must strengthen
their political work.

14. The experience of these three months has proved that the peasants stood
with our Party and our army against the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops
wherever the Central Committee's directive of May 4
[4] was carried out firmly and speedily and the
land problem was solved radically and thoroughly. The peasants took a
wait-and-see attitude wherever the "May 4th Directive" was not carried out
firmly or the arrangements were made too late, or wherever this work was
mechanically divided into stages or land reform was neglected on the excuse
of preoccupation with the war. In the coming few months all areas, no matter
how busy they are with the war, must resolutely lead the peasant masses to
solve the land problem and, on the basis of the land reform, make arrangements
for large-scale production work next year.

15. The experience of these three months has proved that wherever the regional
armed forces, including the people's militia, the guerrillas and the armed
working teams,[5] are well organized, we can control vast
rural areas even though many points and lines are temporarily occupied by
the enemy. But wherever the regional armed forces are weak and the leadership
is poor, the enemy is given a much easier time. From now on, in areas temporarily
occupied by the enemy, we must strengthen the Party's leadership, develop
the regional armed forces, persevere in guerrilla warfare, safeguard the
interests of the masses and strike blows at the activities of the reactionaries.

16. Three months of war have almost exhausted the reserve forces of the
Kuomintang and seriously weakened its military strength in its own areas.
At the same time, the Kuomintang's resumption of conscription and grain
levies[6] has aroused popular discontent and created a
situation favourable for the development of mass struggles. The whole Party
must strengthen its leadership of the mass struggles in the Kuomintang areas
and intensify the work of disintegrating the Kuomintang army.

17. The Kuomintang reactionaries, under the direction of the United States,
have violated the truce agreement and the resolutions of the Political
Consultative Conference of January this year and are determined to wage the
civil war in their attempt to destroy the people's democratic forces. All
their fine words are nothing but humbug; we must expose all the plots of
the United States and Chiang Kai-shek.

18. In these three months the broadest strata of the people in the Kuomintang
areas, including the national bourgeoisie,[7] have quickly
arrived at a better understanding of the fact that the Kuomintang and the
United States government are working in collusion, have started the civil
war and are oppressing the people. More and more people now realize the truth
that Marshall's mediation is a fraud and that the Kuomintang is the arch-criminal
of the civil war. The broad masses, disillusioned with the United States
and the Kuomintang, now place their hopes on the victory of our Party. This
domestic political situation is extremely favourable. The reactionary policy
of U.S. imperialism is rousing increasing discontent among the broad masses
of the people in all countries. The level of political consciousness of the
people in all countries is rising every day. The people's democratic struggle
is mounting in all capitalist countries, the strength of the Communist Parties
in many countries has greatly increased, and it will be impossible for the
reactionaries to reduce them to submission. The might of the Soviet Union
and its prestige among the peoples are growing daily. The U.S. reactionaries
and the reactionaries whom they support in other countries are bound to become
more and more isolated. This international political situation is extremely
favourable. The situation both at home and abroad differs greatly from that
after World War I. The revolutionary forces have grown tremendously since
World War II. We can defeat the Chinese and foreign reactionaries, no matter
how rampant they are (this rampancy is historically inevitable and not at
all strange). Leading comrades in all areas should explain this fully to
those comrades in the Party who are gloomy about the future of the struggle
owing to their inadequate understanding of the favourable situation at home
and abroad. It must be made clear that the enemy still has strength, that
we ourselves still have some weaknesses and that the struggle is still a
long and cruel one. But we can certainly win victory. This understanding
and conviction must be firmly established throughout the Party.

19. The coming few months will be an important and difficult period. We must
strenuously mobilize the whole Party, undertake meticulously planned military
operations and radically change the military situation. All areas must resolutely
carry out the above policies and strive for a radical change in the military
situation.

NOTES


1. See "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of
Self-Defence", pp. 89-95 of this volume.

2. Later developments showed that the situation between
the enemy and ourselves began to change in July 1947, when the
Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan People's Liberation Army forced the Yellow River
and marched towards the Tapieh Mountains. By then the People's Liberation
Army had fought for twelve months and wiped out about a hundred enemy brigades,
averaging eight a month. This exceeded the estimate made in this article
because, with the support of U.S. imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek had used all
his available forces in the offensive.

3. At the end of June 1946 the Central Plains Liberation
Army led by Li Hsien-nien, Cheng Wei-san and other comrades initiated a strategic
shift of its forces and victoriously broke through an encirclement by 300,000
Kuomintang troops. The units mentioned by Comrade Mao Tse-tung as having
moved into the old Liberated Areas were those led by Wang Chen and other
comrades; they entered the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region after breaking
through the encirclement. The guerrilla base in southern Shensi was founded
by a part of the main force of the Central Plains Liberation Army and included
Lushih and Hsichuan in western Honan and Lonan and Shanyang in southern Shensi.
The guerrilla base in western Hupeh was set up by another part of the same
army with the Wutang Mountains in northwestern Hupeh as its centre.

4. This refers to the "Directive on the Land Question"
issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 4,
1946. After Japan's surrender, in view of the peasants' eager demand for
land, the Central Committee decided to change the land policy of the period
of the War of Resistance, that is, to change from the reduction of rent and
interest to confiscation of the land of the landlords and its distribution
among the peasants. The "May 4th Directive" marked this change.

5. The armed working teams were small working teams which
went deep into the enemy-occupied areas to organize the masses and strike
blows at the enemy. Such a team consisted of cadres drawn from various
organizations -- the Communist Party, the governments in the Liberated Areas,
the people's army and mass organizations -- and was equipped with some weapons.
This was a convenient form of organization for carrying out activities in
the enemy-occupied areas.

6. This refers to land taxes in kind.

7. The national bourgeoisie is the section of the bourgeoisie
which has little or no connection with imperialism, as distinguished from
that section of the bourgeoisie which is closely dependent on imperialism
and is comprador in character, that is, the big bourgeoisie or
bureaucrat-capitalists.

Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.