Assemble the Full Forces of the Shandong
and East China Field Armies and Eliminate
the Enemy Moving Eastward North of the
Huai River
(October 15, 1946, 9:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.)
To Chen [Yi], Zhang [Dingcheng], Deng [Zihui], Zeng [Shan], and for the information of Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]:1
We received the telegram you sent last night.2 We are pleased to learn that you
are determined to fight north of the Huai River. The news from Nanjing is that
Chiang’s plan is to lead us to Shandong. We have not been there for some time, so
the enemy is determined to engage us in a decisive battle north of the Huai River.
This type of situation is to our advantage. We hope that you will assemble the
full forces of the Shandong and East China field armies (you absolutely must not
disperse them) and eliminate the enemy moving eastward. Afterward, have the
whole army cross and recover the west bank of the canal. If you eliminate seven
to ten of Xue Yue’s3 brigades within two to three months, it will definitely change
the situation; you can recapture territory on both sides of the Huai River and prepare to advance toward the Central Plains. To carry out this sacred task, it is absolutely crucial for Chen, Zhang, Deng, Zeng, Su, and Tan to unite and cooperate.
Under Chen’s leadership, you should make joint decisions on major policies (the
six of you should get together frequently to avoid bungling military opportunities by sending telegrams back and forth) and give Su responsibility for combat
operations. Ye [Fei]’s4 column and all the garrison brigades should keep watch
on the enemy in southern Shandong, and, if necessary, you can consider sending
over the coastal garrison brigades. As long as you can win a victory north of the
Huai River, the enemy in southern Shandong will not dare to penetrate Linyi. In
sum, changing the situation mainly depends on your armies and the armies of Liu
[Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping].5 The key is to wipe out ten to fifteen of Xue
Yue’s brigades (you are responsible for eliminating seven to ten of them, while
Liu and Deng are responsible for eliminating three to five). As long as you do not
make additional mistakes, this goal is certainly attainable.
The Central Committee

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 525–26, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong
Field Army; Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region; Zeng Shan (1899–1972, native of
Jiangxi) was minister of the Central China Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee; and Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Chen Yi et al. stated that the field armies planned to fight north
of the Huai River, with Li Yannian assigned to attack Shuyang and Su Yu assigned to lead
the First and Sixth Divisions north to assemble in Shuyang. The intention was to win several battles, but if the enemy moved eastward before the Central China Field Army could
return north, the armies would seek opportunities to attack the enemy’s flanks and rear.
This meant delaying the plan to move back to southern Shandong.

3.  Xue Yue was director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-236

4.  Ye Fei was commander of the First Column of the Shandong Field Army.

5.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.