Annihilating the Enemy’s Effective Strength as the Main Objective;
Not Holding or Defending Individual Places as the Main Objective[1]

(September 18, 1946)

Nie, Xiao, Liu, Luo:

(1) Both your telegrams of 18:00 on the 16th and 14:00 on the 17th[2] have been received and noted. (2) We agree with the spirit of your telegram of 18:00 on the 16th. In addition to dispositions on all fronts, concentrate the main forces in appropriate areas to await the enemy’s advance along separate routes, and annihilate one of their divisions (approximately two regiments). After success, if circumstances permit, annihilate another part of them, and the enemy’s first offensive can thereby be broken. Given the terrain and mass conditions from Nankou to Zhangjiakou, if we make thorough preparations in advance and annihilate the enemy piecemeal, the possibility of breaking this offensive exists. (3) This plan for annihilating the enemy is to be mobilized under the slogan of defending Chahar,[3] but with annihilating the enemy’s effective strength as the main objective, not holding or defending individual places as the main objective, so that the main forces can move freely and actively seek out easy-to-fight enemy forces for battle. If at that time the enemy advances densely along several routes to our disadvantage, we may temporarily decide not to fight. If we decide in advance not to fight, we will lose opportunities to fight, which will also be very detrimental to military morale and spirit. (4) Annihilating one or two enemy regiments at a time does not require very many troops. Using several regiments to pin down the enemy on various routes, concentrating ten to fifteen regiments makes it possible to annihilate one enemy brigade (two regiments). Hu Zongnan[4] sent his crack eight brigades (reorganized brigades) into Shanxi. Our Chen Geng Column had only three brigades, yet in the first battle it annihilated one enemy brigade,[5] and now it is preparing to annihilate another brigade. Since one of its brigades was annihilated by us, Hu’s army has become fearful and dares not advance rashly. We hope you will concentrate your attention, make full preparations, and seek good opportunities to annihilate one or two enemy regiments. Winning the first victory will boost military and civilian morale and establish prestige. (5) At the same time, Zhangjiakou should be secretly evacuated in preparation for abandonment when necessary. Such preparations do not contradict the active disposition of the plan to annihilate the enemy. (6) The Jin-Sui forces are to undertake pinning down Fu Zuoyi;[6] Central Hebei and Jin-Hebei are to undertake disrupting the Beiping–Hankou Railway; Rehe[7] and Eastern Hebei are to undertake pinning down the enemy’s rear.

Military Commission

Shenqiao

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[1] After the conclusion of the Datong–Jining Campaign, the Beiping Field Headquarters of the Chairman of the Nationalist Government planned to concentrate the main forces of the 11th and 12th War Zones for a pincer attack on Zhangjiakou from east and west. On September 17, 1946, the leading officers of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region suggested to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee voluntarily withdrawing from Zhangjiakou to seize the initiative. This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee in reply to Nie Rongzhen, Commander and Political Commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region; Xiao Ke, Deputy Commander; Liu Lantao, Deputy Political Commissar; and Luo Ruiqing, Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department.

[2] Refers to the telegrams sent by Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Ke, Liu Lantao, and Luo Ruiqing to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and others at 18:00 on September 16 and 14:00 on September 17, 1946, respectively. The former telegram stated: We annihilated approximately 5,000 of Fu Zuoyi’s troops near Jining but failed to destroy his main force. The fall of Jining on the 14th threatens the offensive against Datong, so we have resolved to lift the siege of Datong. In view of the situation that the Beiping–Suiyuan Railway will be subjected to severe enemy attacks, we have assembled our main forces in preparation to strike the attacking enemy and defend Chahar. To coordinate with the main forces in defending Chahar, our troops in Rehe should pin down the enemy in Rehe, Eastern Hebei should at an appropriate time move to the area east of Beiping and Ji County, the five brigades originally designated for the Beiping–Hankou Campaign and local armed forces everywhere should immediately prepare to attack the Beiping–Hankou Railway, and the eastern part of Central Hebei and the 10th Sub-district should disrupt the Beiping–Liaoning Railway between Beiping and Tianjin behind enemy lines. The latter telegram stated: Under the circumstances of the enemy’s pincer attack on Zhangjiakou from east and west, we intend to conduct only covering operations during the enemy offensive and not to mount a stubborn defense.

[3] Chahar was an old province name, originally encompassing the northwestern part of present-day Hebei Province and the Xilingol League of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In 1949 its jurisdiction was changed to cover the northwestern part of present-day Hebei Province and the northwestern part of Shanxi Province, and it was abolished in 1952.

[4] Hu Zongnan was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s 1st War Zone.

[5] From July 13 to 22, 1946, the 4th Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, commanded by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, achieved victory in the first battle of the Wenxi–Xiaxian Campaign in Shanxi by completely annihilating the 31st Brigade of the Nationalist Army’s Reorganized 27th Division.

[6] Fu Zuoyi was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s 12th War Zone.

[7] Rehe was an old province name, encompassing the northeastern part of present-day Hebei Province, the southwestern part of Liaoning Province, and the southeastern part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It was abolished in 1955.