Resolutely Overcome All Thoughts of
Retreating; Establish Base Areas behind
Enemy Lines
(September 10, 1946)
To all the comrades of the district Party committees, and for the information of
the Central Plains Bureau:1
	 1.	 We completely agree with the Central Plains Bureau’s September 8 telegram2
that all fifteen brigades should be transferred promptly to southern Shaanxi
and that some other forces should be sent to Dahongshan to establish contact
with the local forces and to develop the base areas there. In that way, the
western and central parts of Hubei and southern Shaanxi will form a pincer
that holds a large part of Chiang’s forces in check, thus helping northern
China, Central China, and the Northwest crush the Guomindang’s attacks.
This is your great strategic task; you should convey this strategic task to all
officers and men and resolutely overcome all thoughts of returning to your
units.
	 2.	 Chiang’s army is deploying fourteen brigades to deal with our Central Plains
armies (including those in southern Shaanxi; western, central, and eastern
Hubei; and western Anhui). Chiang’s army is deploying ninety-eight brigades along the lower reaches of the Yangzi River, the southern branch of
the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou]3 railway, the New Yellow River,4 and the entirety of the Longhai railway (from Xuzhou to Tianshui) to attack our Liberated
Areas in central Jiangsu, Huaihai, southern Shandong, eastern Henan, western Shandong, southern Shanxi, and eastern Gansu. In a span of less than two
months between July 13 and September 8, we have annihilated or crippled
eighteen-and-a-half enemy brigades. We plan to annihilate another twenty
or so brigades over the next four to six months to enable us to crush the
Guomindang’s large-scale attacks and its prospects of making gains in the
Central Plains. If we can destroy another twenty enemy brigades, the armies
of Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]5 will certainly be able to cross the
New Yellow River and advance toward the Nanyang-Xinyang railway, and
our Central China army and a unit of the Shandong army will certainly be
able to advance toward the Dabie Mountains. At that time, they can directly
cooperate with you in battle.
	 3.	 For this reason, resolutely overcome all thoughts of retreating, establish
several base areas behind enemy lines, and overcome large numbers of the
enemy in their firmly entrenched positions. This is your sacred task.
	 4.	 While it might be possible for a small army that is near its base to take the
risk of retreating, a large and remote army like yours could become dangerously worn down if forced to withdraw. Hence, you absolutely must not do
this.
	 5.	 To carry out the above strategic task and more easily solve the problems
of food and clothing, you should follow the instructions of the Central
Plains Bureau. Quickly transfer the Fifteenth Brigade to southern Shaanxi,
and then send Li Renlin6 to take radio equipment and a fairly large force to
Dahongshan.
	 6.	 If there are extreme difficulties in supplying food and clothing to the troops
in northwestern Hubei, apart from the decision to send the Fifteenth Brigade
and Chen Xianrui’s7 unit to southern Shaanxi and the need for all of Luo
[Houfu] and Wen [Minsheng]’s8 forces to remain in northwestern Hubei
unchanged, you can consider having Wang [Shusheng] and Liu [Zijiu]9 lead
a column of the main forces to Dahongshan to develop base areas. But you must allow for the contingency of the whole of the Sixty-sixth Division and
the majority of the Seventy-second Division marching on central Hubei.
	 7.	 In short, no matter what happens you must create base areas behind enemy
lines, and you must not retreat. You must launch a resolute struggle against
the especially dangerous thought of retreating, which runs counter to the
strategic task. You must oppose the wavering and fleeing of some comrades
in the face of difficulty.
	 8.	 You may inform leading cadres in all districts of the gist of this telegram, but
you all must burn it promptly after reading it. You must not lose it or verbally
transmit it to comrades below the district level.
The Central Committee

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 472–74, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

2.  The telegram from the Central Plains Bureau stated that leaving the main force of the
Central Plains army behind enemy lines might be the most effective strategy to ensure survival and advancement. Overcoming any thoughts of retreating north, the fifteen brigades
should all immediately move into Shaanxi, with one section crossing the Xiang River east
of Dahongshan to inflict a new phase of heavy losses on the enemy.

3.  The Tianjin-Pukou railway was part of what is now the Beijing-Shanghai railway.

4.  This refers to Chiang Kaishek’s strategy in June 1938 to destroy a dam on the Yellow
River north of Zhengzhou to divert the water and create a floodplain to obstruct the Japanese army from moving west. The dam breach was repaired in 1947.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-226

5.  Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were the commander and political commissar,
respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) Field Army.

6.  Li Renlin (1914–1995, native of Hubei) was political commissar of the Northwest
Hubei Fourth Military Subdistrict.

7.  Chen Xianrui (1914–1996, native of Anhui) was deputy commander and chief-ofstaff of the E-Yu-Shaan (Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi) Military Region.

8.  Luo Houfu (1909–1975, native of Hubei) and Wen Minsheng (1915–1997, native of
Shanxi) were second deputy commander and second deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Hubei Military Region.

9.  Wang Shusheng and Liu Zijiu were commander and political commissar, and first
deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northwest Hubei Military Region.