Opinion on Dealing with the Enemy at Hai’an and Rugao[1]

(August 20, 1946)

To Su and Tan, and for the information of Chen and Song[2]:

After your main force has captured and occupied the line of Ding, Bai, Tong, and Hai[3], if the enemy at Hai and Ru[4] moves south, then annihilate that enemy. However, it is also possible that this enemy may hold fast to its original positions and not dare to move south. In such a situation, consider whether the second step could be to capture and occupy Motou Town, Zhanghuang Port, and Jiali Market[5], and to seize the opportunity to capture Huangqiao, so as to draw out or force back the enemy at Hai and Ru. Annihilating the enemy troops in these market towns behind enemy lines, even if only one battalion or one company at each location, would be of tremendous significance. If we can recover places such as Huangqiao and Jiangduo, then the enemy at Hai, Ru, Qu, and Jiang[6] will become isolated and will inevitably be drawn out or forced to retreat. Whether this is feasible, please decide based on the actual situation.

Military Commission

Weihao

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Su Yu, commander of the Central China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin, its political commissar.
[2] Chen and Song refer to Chen Yi and Song Shilun, who were then respectively commander and political commissar, and chief of staff, of the Shandong Field Army.
[3] Ding, Bai, Tong, and Hai refer to Dingyan, Baipu, Nantong, and Haimen in central Jiangsu Province.
[4] Ru refers to Rugao in Jiangsu Province.
[5] Jiali Market, a village located southwest of Rugao County, Jiangsu Province.
[6] Qu and Jiang refer to Qutang and Jiangyan in central Jiangsu Province.