Drawing in Chiang’s Army to Reinforce
Central Jiangsu Will Greatly Benefit the
Overall Situation
(August 31, 1946)
To Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]; and for the information of Chen [Yi], Zhang
[Dingcheng], and Deng [Zihui], and Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1
	 1.	 We received the telegram sent by Su and Tan on the 29th2 and very much
agree with the opinions therein. Regardless of how the enemy’s situation
changes, the First and Sixth divisions should rest and reorganize for at
least ten days and replenish their ranks. After the Fifth Brigade occupies
Huangqiao, it should also rest and reorganize, conserving strength and storing up energy in preparation for more fighting. Pi Dingjun’s brigade3 should head for the area southwest of Rugao, draw close to the main forces, and take
part in the fighting.
	 2.	 If, in accordance with what you said, you can draw several divisions of
Chiang’s army to reinforce central Jiangsu, it will be very beneficial to the
overall situation. After all reinforcement divisions have arrived, if you can
follow the fighting method of July and August and wipe them out one by one,
it will also benefit central Jiangsu.
The Military Commission
---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 449–50, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar of the Shandong
Field Army. Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping
were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi, Hebei,
Shandong, Henan) Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin reported that the Central China Campaign
had destroyed the offensive capabilities of the existing enemy forces. It was anticipated that
the Guomindang would shift six divisions to the Central China Military Region to open up
the Haitai, Rugao, and Tongru communication routes. At the time, the Central China forces
were exhausted and needed to take ten days of rest. There were six divisions temporarily
in Rugao, some resting and regrouping in West Hai’an and some intensifying the encirclement of Hai’an, having ordered the Fifth Brigade to storm and capture Huangqiao. If the
Guomindang was unable to send reinforcements to Rugao and Hai’an within ten days, the
Central Field Army would capture Hai’an; otherwise, it would wait until the Guomindang
army had dispersed.

3.  Pi Dingjun (1914–1976, born in Jinzhai, Anhui) was commander of the First Brigade of the First Column of the former Central Plains Military Region. After the brigade
broke the siege of the Jiangsu-Anhui Liberated Area, it was re-designated as the Thirteenth
Brigade of the Central China Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-219