Seek Opportunities to Destroy the Enemy and Create a Favorable Situation[1]

(August 29, 1946)

Comrade Chen:

Your telegram of the 26th[2] has been received. (1) At present the enemy is gradually moving eastward in an attempt to open up the Longhai Railway and threaten Huaiyin and Linyi. Our army must seek opportunities to destroy the enemy. The plan for our army to rest and consolidate for one month is in fact impossible and would place us in a passive position. You should lead the main force to wait for opportunities in the area east of Suining, and following the method of Su Yu,[3] concentrate the main force to destroy one part of the enemy, rest and consolidate for a number of days and then fight again, and after fighting rest and consolidate for another number of days. In this way, high morale can be constantly maintained, and discipline can also be improved. September is precisely the time for combat operations. The Liu-Deng[4] army and the Central Plains army both hope for coordination by your army. If we do not fight now, the more territory the enemy occupies, the greater his arrogance becomes, and both the morale of our army and the people will suffer. Therefore, we must seek opportunities to fight, crush the enemy’s arrogance, and boost our own morale. Each time we destroy one regiment or one brigade of the enemy, and after doing so five or six times, a favorable situation can be created.

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to be sent to Chen Yi, Commander and Political Commissar of the Shandong Field Army.
[2] This refers to the telegram sent by Chen Yi and Song Shilun to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on August 26, 1946. The telegram proposed three plans for the Shandong Field Army’s combat operations along the Longhai Railway and north of the Huai River: The first plan was for the Shandong Field Army to lead the 2nd, 7th, and 8th Divisions to strike the enemy’s 28th Army; the second plan was for the Shandong Field Army to assemble east of Siyang and the Grand Canal to strive for one month of rest and consolidation; the third plan was for the entire Shandong Field Army to move south to prepare to link up with Su Yu for an offensive. Their opinion emphasized adopting the method of resting, training, and waiting for opportunities east of Siyang and the Grand Canal, which would allow movement north or south and a westward counterattack as circumstances permitted.
[3] Su Yu, then Commander of the Central China Field Army.
[4] Liu-Deng refers to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army.

(2) Use local units to deal with Feng Zhi’an’s[1] forces, and transfer the Ye-Lai Column[2] to undertake the task of annihilating the 28th Division (engaging them in several separate battles, each time destroying one to two regiments). What is your opinion?

Military Commission

Weiyan[3]

[1] Feng Zhi’an, then Commander of the 3rd Pacification Zone of the Kuomintang Army.
[2] The Ye-Lai Column refers to the 1st Column of the Shandong Field Army, which was then undertaking combat tasks in the direction of the Jiaoji Railway. Column Commander Ye Fei, Political Commissar Lai Chuanzhu.
[3] Weiyan is the date code for August 29.