Guiding Principles for Annihilating the
Enemy in Shandong and Central China
(August 29, 1946)
To Chen [Yi], Zhang [Yunyi], Li [Yu], Zhang [Jingcheng], Deng [Zihui], Su
[Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for transmission to the Party committees of every
region and the commanding officers of each division and column:1
The Ninth Division in Central Shandong successfully attacked Wenzu and
Bucun,2 and the Central Shandong Garrison Brigade successfully attacked
Weijiazhuang.3 We hope you will cite the officers and soldiers for their meritorious service. Even though these are small victories, they should be rewarded for
boosting the morale of the people and damaging the enemy’s prestige. We should
encourage all regular forces, local forces, and militiamen to bring their initiative
into play, fight more winning battles, and strike enemy forces one by one and
wipe them out in large quantities. You should tell the whole Party and the whole
army in Shandong and Central China that we must eliminate large numbers of
the regular forces under Wang Yaowu4 (fourteen brigades), Xue Yue5 (thirty-five brigades), and Tang Enbo6 (fifteen brigades); only then will we be able to solve
our problems. The first objective of our forces in Jiaoji, southern Shandong, and
northern Jiangsu should be to wipe out one-third of the forces under Wang Yaowu
and Xue Yue (that is, five and twelve brigades, respectively). During the past
month and a half (from July 13 to August 27), our forces in central Jiangsu have
eliminated six-and-a-half brigades of the enemy’s regular troops and 5,000 transportation security police, or nearly one-half of the enemy forces. Hereafter, the
goal should be to wipe out eight-tenths to nine-tenths of the enemy. Our method
for eliminating the enemy involves assembling a large force to strike one unit
of enemy troops. For example, during the July 27 Yugou Campaign in northern
Jiangsu,7 we brought together twelve regiments (only seven regiments were used)
to eliminate two regiments of the enemy’s Ninety-second Brigade. Another good
example is the August 26 Campaign in southwestern Rugao of central Jiangsu,8
when we assembled ten regiments to wipe out two regiments of the enemy’s
Ninety-ninth Brigade. From the perspective of the overall situation, these tactics
require less strength and bring greater success. Victory is assured in each battle,
allowing us to thoroughly wipe out the enemy and to win swift victories. We
must educate our cadres to adopt these tactics universally. The field army should
place emphasis on replenishing its ranks. The three war zones in Jiaoji, northern
Jiangsu, and central Jiangsu should each replenish ten to fifteen regiments of their
main forces for the field army. Each of the regiments should consist of 2,500 to
3,000 troops (the Guomindang has regiments of more than 3,000 troops). They
should be equipped with the best weapons and enough ammunition to be used as
shock troops; do not adopt equalitarianism. We hope you will plan everything in
accordance with the above guiding principles.
The Central Committee
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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 440–42, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Yi was commander and political commissar, and Zhang Yunyi
was deputy commander and Li Yu was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the
Shandong Military Region; Zhang Jingcheng was commander and Deng Zihui was political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Military Region. Su Yu was commander
and Tan Zhenlin was political commissar, respectively, of the Central China Field Army.

2.  From August 24 to 25, 1946, the Central Shandong Military Region combined the
Fourth and Ninth divisions for a battle force four times the size of the Guomindang forces
in a long-range raid on Wenzu village and Bu village in Zhangqiu county, Shandong Province. They attacked the Guomindang’s Reorganized Fifteenth Division, eliminating one
regiment and sixteen companies of five battalions as well as defeating two regiments of
reinforcements.

3.  From August 24 to 25, 1946, the Central Shandong Military Region’s Zhangqiu county
independent battalion coordinated with the Fourth Division’s reconnaissance company to
encircle and repeatedly attack the enemy, while the Zhangqiu Armed Working Team led a
surprise attack on the headquarters of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Fifteenth Division.

4.  Wang Yaowu (1904–1968, native of Shandong) was commander of the Guomindang’s Second Pacification Zone.

5.  Xue Yue (1896–1998, native of Guangdong) was director of the Guomindang’s
Xuzhou Pacification Office.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-217

6.  Tang Enbo (1900–1952, native of Zhejiang) was deputy director of the Guomindang’s Xuzhou Pacification Office and commander of the First Pacification Zone.

7.  In the Yugou Campaign, also known as the Zhaoyang Campaign, from July 27 to 29,
1946, the Shandong Field Army concentrated its strength in Zhaoyang, Lingbi county, in
northern Anhui Province, wiping out the Ninety-second and Sixtieth brigades of the Guomindang’s Reorganized Ninety-fifth Division, a total of 5,000 troops.

8.  See “The Battle Experience of the Central China Field Army,” August 28, 1946, in
this volume.