Problem of the Operational Plan for Seeking Opportunities to Annihilate Eight to Ten Brigades of Xue Yue’s Troops[1]

(August 27, 1946)

Chen, and inform Liu and Deng, Zhang and Li[2]:

According to the Xiao telegram from Zhang and Li,[3] they advocate moving the main force northward to rely on the Longhai Line to annihilate the 28th Division and the 74th Division, which would facilitate maneuver, etc. Now that autumn is high and the waters have receded, it is precisely the time to annihilate the enemy. Xue Yue[4] has over thirty brigades at his disposal. Whether our army is on the Jinpu Line,[5] on the Longhai Line, between the two lines, or elsewhere, in short, we must seek opportunities to annihilate eight to ten brigades of Xue Yue’s regular forces (Liu and Deng

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Chen Yi, Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Shandong Field Army.

[2] Liu and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Zhang and Li refer to Zhang Yunyi and Li Yu, who were then respectively First Deputy Commander and Deputy Political Commissar of the Shandong Military Region.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Zhang Yunyi, Li Yu, Shu Tong, and Yuan Zhongxian to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and Chen Yi on August 26, 1946. The telegram stated: The enemy at Xuzhou continues to advance eastward, seemingly intending to control the eastern section of the Longhai Line to sever our Central China and Shandong Liberated Areas, then push northward to open a corridor, launching converging attacks from north and south in an attempt to achieve the objective of destroying our forces piecemeal. We suggest that if the field army currently in Huaibei has no favorable battles to fight, it should move its main force northward to rely on the Longhai Line for rest and reorganization, preparing to annihilate the advancing diehard Reorganized 28th Division and Reorganized 74th Division, so as to open up the eastern section of the Longhai Line. This would facilitate future maneuver of the field army in operations in Central China and Shandong, and would also coordinate with the operations of Liu and Deng.

[4] Xue Yue was then Director of the Xuzhou Pacification Headquarters of the Nationalist Army.

[5] The Jinpu Line refers to the railway from Tianjin to Pukou, i.e., a section of the present-day Beijing-Shanghai Line.

must annihilate eight to ten brigades of Liu Zhi’s[1] forces) before the problem can be preliminarily resolved. Please consider whether there is still hope of cutting the Jinpu Line to maneuver the enemy into fighting a field battle. If there is hope, then it would be advantageous to cut the Jinpu Line and carry out the original plan; if there is no hope, then we must consider whether there is a danger that the enemy advancing eastward could cut off our main force south of the Longhai Line. Also, please consider whether annihilating the enemy in the Suining-Suqian area is more advantageous than annihilating them on the Longhai Line. If there is no danger of being cut off, and annihilating the enemy in Suining-Suqian is more advantageous, then we can annihilate the enemy there; if there is a danger of being cut off, and annihilating the enemy on the Longhai Line is also advantageous, then it would be appropriate to act according to the proposal in the You telegram from Zhang and Li. As to which course should be taken to facilitate opening up the situation, please consider and reply.

Military Commission

Wei Gan

[1] Liu Zhi was then Director of the Zhengzhou Pacification Headquarters of the Nationalist Army.