--- Notes

To All Commanders:  1. The operational doctrine of concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy in detail should be applied not only at the campaign level but also in tactical engagements.

2. At the campaign level, when the enemy advances toward us along multiple axes with numerous brigades or regiments, we must first concentrate our main effort against a single, numerically weaker enemy formation—typically one brigade or six to eight regiments. This concentration should amount to at least three times the enemy’s strength in that sector, provided that friendly reinforcements are limited and local terrain and popular sentiment favor our position. Meanwhile, a smaller force should be tasked with containing the remaining enemy units, preventing them from rapidly reinforcing the isolated target. Once this target is destroyed, we may either proceed to eliminate additional enemy formations—for example, as in August 1946, when the Central China Field Army under粟TAN near Rugao first wiped out 5,000 enemy gendarmes on August 11, then a full brigade on August 13, and subsequently a half-brigade on August 14—or withdraw to reorganize and prepare for further operations. We must avoid the erroneous practice of underestimating the enemy and thereby dividing our forces evenly among all enemy axes, resulting in failure to destroy any single column and placing ourselves in a passive defensive posture.

3. At the tactical level, when our forces have massed an overwhelming superiority to strike one of the enemy’s advancing columns—a brigade or regiment—the attacking corps or units should not attempt to simultaneously liquidate the entire target by spreading their own forces thinly across multiple fronts; such piecemeal attacks will lack punch and prolong the engagement without achieving decisive results. Instead, they should concentrate a decisive advantage, ranging from sixfold to at least threefold over the enemy, bringing in all available artillery, select the weakest point in the enemy’s line, and deliver a concentrated, all-out assault aimed at complete destruction. Upon success, the gains should be swiftly expanded to finish off the remainder of the enemy force.

4. This approach yields two key advantages: thorough annihilation and rapid decision. Thoroughness is most effective because it inflicts maximum damage upon the enemy, reducing both its organizational cohesion and combat effectiveness—particularly for adversaries lacking strategic reserves (i.e., frontline troops). It is also highly beneficial in terms of replenishing our own resources: not only does it serve as the primary source of weapons and ammunition for our forces today, but it also provides valuable manpower. Conversely, the enemy’s morale suffers grievously, while ours soars and popular support strengthens. Moreover, the speed with which we can isolate and destroy individual enemy units facilitates the avoidance of reinforcement, making it possible to achieve tactical breakthroughs that lay the groundwork for strategic success.

5. Currently, many of our cadres espouse the principle of concentrating forces to defeat the enemy in detail during peacetime, yet fail to implement it in actual combat. This stems from underestimation of the enemy and from insufficient study and education. It is imperative to present concrete examples repeatedly, clearly demonstrating the merits of this method and emphasizing that it constitutes the principal means of repelling Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary offensive. Success depends on its rigorous application; deviation from it leads inevitably to failure.

6. The principle of concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy piecemeal has been an esteemed tradition of our army for more than a decade. It is not a novel concept. However, during the War of Resistance Against Japan, our primary mode of operation was guerrilla warfare conducted with dispersed forces, with mobile warfare using concentrated forces employed only as a supplementary tactic. With the advent of the civil war, the situation has reversed: mobile warfare under centralized command has become the mainstay, while guerrilla operations now play a supporting role. Given the relative strengthening of Chiang’s forces, we must place particular emphasis on employing the tactic of concentrating overwhelming superiority to destroy the enemy in separate engagements.

7. When the enemy holds the offensive initiative and we are on the defensive, this method must be strictly adhered to. Conversely, when we enjoy the initiative and the enemy is on the defensive, there are two scenarios where alternative approaches may be appropriate: if our local forces are significantly weaker, or if we launch a surprise attack, we may simultaneously strike several enemy targets—for instance, in Shandong in June 1946, when our forces simultaneously assaulted and captured Jiaozhou and Jinan on the Jiaoji and Jinpu railways. On the other hand, if our forces are insufficient to mount a coordinated assault, we should proceed by individually retaking each occupied town or city—as, for example, our Shanxi forces did along the Tongpu Railway.

8. While our main forces are engaged in concentrated operations to destroy the enemy, local corps, guerrilla units, and militia must actively cooperate and provide complementary support. The principle of concentrating forces to defeat the enemy in detail applies equally to local units when they confront enemy regiments, battalions, or companies.

9. The objective of concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy in detail is primarily to destroy the enemy’s fighting power, rather than simply holding or seizing territory. There may be occasions when, in order to concentrate our forces against the enemy or to spare our main body from severe attrition and preserve it for future operations, we deem it acceptable to relinquish certain areas—provided that we can still obliterate the enemy’s core combat strength. Such actions should be permitted, since the loss of territorial control can always be rectified through subsequent campaigns, and new gains can likewise be secured. Accordingly, all efforts to destroy the enemy’s fighting power should be rewarded—not only regular units, but also paramilitary organizations such as security detachments and local self-defense militias. Nevertheless, any territories whose retention or capture would hold significant strategic or tactical value in the broader context of the campaign must be defended or seized; otherwise, it constitutes a grave error. Therefore, those who successfully secure or hold onto such positions deserve special recognition. August 16, 1946