Do Not Fight Battles That Can Only Route but Not Annihilate the Enemy[1]

(August 3, 1946)

Comrades Chen and Song, with copies to Liu and Deng, and Zhang, Deng, and Su:[2]

Your telegram of July 31[3] has been noted. Do not fight any battle that can only route but not annihilate the enemy. As long as you hold the main force in hand, there will always be opportunities to wipe out the enemy. Overly impatient views are not appropriate.

The Military Commission

Weijiang

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Chen Yi, commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Song Shilun, its chief of staff.

[2] Liu and Deng: Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, then commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. Zhang, Deng, and Su: Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Su Yu, then commander, political commissar, and deputy commander of the Central China Military Area.

[3] Refers to the telegram of July 31, 1946, from Chen Yi and Song Shilun to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Yunyi, Li Yu, Yuan Zhongxian, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Su Yu. The telegram stated that enemy main forces on both sides of the Longhai Railway had been reinforced, with 15 regiments currently massing at Shuanggou and Caobaji. As the situation had changed, making only routing but not annihilation possible, our army had decided to move its main force toward Lingbi and Sixian to seek battle with the Guangxi diehards, planning first to wipe out two regiments and then turn to attack the Xuzhou-Suzhou section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway.

As Long as You Hold a Mobile Force of Fifty Thousand in Hand, There Will Always Be Opportunities to Wipe Out the Enemy[1]

(August 4, 1946)

Comrades Chen and Song:

(1) The decision to transfer the Ye-Lai Column southward[2] will not be changed. (2) Whether the Su Yu Group[3] should be moved at this time has its pros and cons; further consideration will be given and you will be informed later. (3) You have a mobile force of fifty thousand in hand. As long as you are patient and not impetuous, you can always find opportunities to wipe out the enemy one by one. Apart from the enemy forces at Lingbi and Sixian,[4] which are scattered and isolated, when the enemy at Shuanggou[5] moves further east, you will find opportunities to fight good battles. If you can fight three or four battles, each wiping out two or three enemy regiments, the situation can be turned around. (4) What are the results of the attack on Sixian? (5) Telegraph transmission has been very slow lately. Your telegram of July 31 was not read until August 3, and your two telegrams of August 1 were not read until August 4.

The Military Commission

Weizhiwu

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Chen Yi, commander and political commissar of the Shandong Field Army, and Song Shilun, its chief of staff.

[2] In July 1946, the Shandong Field Army decided that the 1st Column, commanded by Commander Ye Fei and Political Commissar Lai Chuanzhu, would, after completing its combat tasks on the Qingdao-Jinan Railway, move south to Huaiyin to fight as originally planned.

[3] The Su Yu Group refers to the Central China Field Army, commanded by Su Yu.

[4] Lingbi and Sixian, in Anhui Province.

[5] Shuanggou, a town northwest of Suining County, Jiangsu Province.