To the Directors of All Bureaus and Commanders of All Military Regions, with copy to Division and Corps Commanders:  According to Chen Geng’s telegram of the 14th, early morning hour: Last night (the 13th), the main force of my corps launched a piecemeal annihilation campaign against the right wing of the diehard forces advancing toward Wenxi. After five hours of night fighting, two regiments of the diehards’ 11th Brigade were wiped out.  According to incomplete statistics, we captured four mountain guns, seven mortars, eight heavy machine guns, over 500 rifles, and more than 30 light machine guns; took over 1,000 prisoners; and suffered very few casualties ourselves.  We are now conducting the second phase of the operation, continuing to destroy this band of diehards.  Furthermore, according to Chen Geng’s telegram of the 15th, early morning hour: The second engagement at Wenxi took place on the night of the 14th, with fierce fighting throughout the night. As a result, we seized six mountain guns, two anti-tank guns, eleven mortars, two small artillery pieces, eight heavy machine guns, several dozen light machine guns, and over 500 rifles, while capturing more than 700 enemy soldiers. Our troops’ morale is high. Hu Zongnan[4] has ordered the First and Tenth Armies to prepare for continued operations, it is reported.

This time, Yan[3]’s forces—over 10,000 men—and the Twenty-Seventh Army—more than 50,000—launched an offensive against our Jinan Liberated Area.  My Chen Geng Corps has now commenced operations, adopting the principle of concentrating our main strength to strike a single enemy formation and destroying them piecemeal, and has achieved two successive victories.  All units engaged in combat elsewhere should likewise employ this method: each time, concentrate superior force to defeat one enemy unit, maintaining a ratio of at least three to one, preferably four to one, in order to ensure victory and annihilate the enemy in detail.  It is imperative that this tactical approach be widely disseminated through education to officers at regimental level and above.

Printed by the Military Commission based on a lead-type print preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes [1] Chen Geng was then commander of the Fourth Corps of the Jinji-Luyu Field Army.  [2] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the CPC Central Military Commission and addressed to the various central bureaus and military regions.  [3] “Yan” refers to Yan Xishan, who at the time served as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army’s Second War Zone.  [4] Hu Zongnan was then commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army’s First War Zone.