Comrade Lin Biao [2]: With regard to the Resolution on the Situation and Tasks in Northeast China, I propose the following amendments:  (1) Revise the first paragraph as follows: Last August, the valiant Soviet Red Army entered China to attack the Japanese aggressors. Our Northeast Democratic United Army, in close cooperation with the people of Northeast China, fought alongside the Red Army, annihilating the Japanese invaders and the puppet Manchukuo regime, thereby opening up a path to a free life for the people of the region.  From the very outset of the Japanese invasion, our Party in Northeast China led the local population in organizing anti-Japanese volunteer armies, opposing Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of non-resistance and waging a long and heroic struggle. Following the general counteroffensive against Japan, our Party dispatched large numbers of troops and cadres from inland China to Northeast China, helping the local people establish the vast Northeast Liberated Area.  However, Chiang Kai-shek, guilty of having lost Northeast China yet claiming no credit for its recovery, under the backing of U.S. reactionaries and in violation of peace agreements, launched a massive offensive against the Northeast Liberated Area. Beginning with the Shanhaiguan Campaign last November [3] and continuing until the ceasefire between the two sides on June 7 of this year, our Northeast Democratic United Army and the people of Northeast China waged a courageous and resolute war of self-defense.  Although the two sides are currently still observing a ceasefire, the possibility of renewed hostilities remains.  Mass work and the resolution of land issues across the broad expanse of Northeast China are still in their initial stages. Our rural base areas remain unstable, and many of our cadres have yet to fully grasp the necessity and importance of penetrating deeply into the countryside to engage in prolonged, arduous struggle for the purpose of establishing such bases.  At present, both the international and domestic situations are conducive to our Party’s establishment of a base area in Northeast China and to the defeat of any potential renewed offensive by Chiang’s forces. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge our own weaknesses and overcome them if we are to achieve our objectives.

(2) Amend subparagraph (a) of the second paragraph as follows: Overcome the confusion surrounding the question of peace and war, and prepare to secure peace through protracted, arduous struggle.  Currently, tensions between Britain and the United States are mounting, while internal divisions within the United States are extremely acute. As for Chiang Kai-shek, his forces are generally insufficient to meet operational requirements nationwide, popular sentiment is adverse, and the economy is in dire straits. Most importantly, our Party and our army possess considerable strength and are firmly resolved to fight.  Under these circumstances, Chiang was compelled, after the expiration of the fifteen-day and eight-day ceasefires, to announce an indefinite ceasefire [4]. In certain areas where Chiang’s forces are weak, a ceasefire may indeed be advantageous; but in regions where his forces are strong—for example, in the Central Plains and along the Jiaozhou–Jinan Railway—Chiang has already initiated major offensives, and another large-scale campaign against Suwan Province appears imminent.  In Northeast China, Chiang’s forces are currently inadequate, making a ceasefire more favorable to us; should reinforcements arrive, however, there would be a high likelihood of renewed aggression against our positions.  During the Nanjing negotiations [5] this time, aside from agreeing to allow us to retain parts of Xing’an Province, Xinjiang Province, and Nenjiang Province [6], together with the Yanji region, Chiang insisted on reclaiming all other territories—seeking not merely isolated points but entire swaths of land. This is entirely unacceptable to us.  Rather than surrendering such vast tracts of territory without a fight, only to lose any prospect of regaining them in the future, it is far preferable to risk losing ground in battle, knowing that such losses can later be recovered. Moreover, even if we were to relinquish control over certain key urban thoroughfares, we would still retain an excellent chance of defeating Chiang’s forces and recapturing much of what had been lost.  Therefore, the entire Party must resolve itself to make every possible preparation for repelling Chiang’s offensive, using victory in war to secure peace. All vacillating attitudes and hopes for peace based on mere chance must be completely discarded.  Guided by this overarching principle of single-mindedly preparing for peace through prolonged, arduous struggle, our approach consists in strengthening the revolutionary forces and weakening the counter-revolutionary elements—through warfare, mass work, resolving land issues to improve the people’s livelihoods, and all other efforts—so as to shift the balance of power decisively in our favor. The most crucial aspect of this is the full mobilization of the masses, thereby forging a close bond between our Party and the people. Once the strength of the broad masses tips the scales in our favor, the balance of power will change to our advantage, enabling us to establish a solid base area that the enemy will be unable to overcome.  In sum, peace is both necessary and attainable; yet our primary reliance should be on our own internal strengths rather than external assistance. Only by achieving self-reliance and self-strengthening—by possessing our own means and securing an invincible position—can external support from both international and domestic quarters truly prove effective in securing peace. Otherwise, such support would be unreliable and even dangerous.

(3) Delete the sentence “Establish base areas backed by Korea, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and Rehe [7].”

(4) In subparagraph (c), state first that the aim of our struggle and warfare is to defend the Liberated Area, since the people of Northeast China have already been liberated from Japanese and puppet rule and have established their own Liberated Area enjoying freedom. However, Chinese reactionaries, aided by foreign reactionaries, have launched attacks against our Liberated Area. Our Northeast Democratic United Army and the people of Northeast China have no choice but to wage a war of self-defense; for to fail to do so would mean utter destruction. Thus, such a defensive struggle is entirely justified and imperative. Only thereafter should we go on to discuss the struggle for economic, political, and military democracy, along with its specific content. Do not raise slogans of class struggle.

(5) Agree with all other sections.  Printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft by the Central Committee at noon.

Notes [1] In early July 1946, the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee convened an enlarged meeting in Harbin to analyze the domestic and international situation as well as the situation in Northeast China, to summarize the lessons learned over the past year in establishing base areas and in repelling Nationalist offensives, and to reach a unified understanding on such matters as the imbalance of power between ourselves and the enemy, the issue of peace versus war, the relationship between cities and the countryside, and the principles guiding our military operations. On the fifth day, the Northeast Bureau submitted the draft resolution titled “The Situation and Tasks in Northeast China,” prepared by Chen Yun, to the CPC Central Committee for approval.

[2] Lin Biao was then Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army.

[3] On November 1, 1945, Nationalist forces that had landed at Qinhuangdao launched a surprise attack on Shanhaiguan. Troops of the Ji-Re-Liao Military Region defending Shanhaiguan, together with units transferred from Shandong to Northeast China, mounted a vigorous defense and counterattack. By November 16, they had withdrawn from Shanhaiguan and fallen back to Suizhong.

[4] At the suggestion of U.S. President’s Special Envoy Marshall, after consultations between the two sides, both the Communists and the Nationalists issued separate statements on June 6, 1946, announcing a fifteen-day ceasefire in Northeast China effective from 12:00 noon on June 7, during which negotiations would take place. On the twenty-first, Chiang announced an extension of the Northeast ceasefire to thirty days. Upon the expiration of this thirty-day period as well, facing pressure from various quarters and encountering resolute resistance, Chiang again declared an indefinite ceasefire in Northeast China.

[5] Refers to the negotiations held between the Communists and the Nationalists in Nanjing from June 10 to July 10, 1946, concerning three issues: ending the conflict in Northeast China, restoring transportation links, and reorganizing the armed forces.

[6] Xing’an Province, Xinjiang Province, and Nenjiang Province were newly demarcated provinces in Northeast China by the Nationalist government following Japan’s surrender. At that time, the Nationalist government divided Northeast China into nine provinces; the territories encompassed by Xing’an, Xinjiang, and Nenjiang correspond roughly to the northeastern part of today’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and the western part of Heilongjiang Province.

[7] Rehe refers to Rehe Province, see note [3] on page 10 of this volume.