Timing and Operational Dispositions for Attacking the Peiping–Hankow Railway[1]

(July 6, 1946)

Nieh:

Your telegram of the 4th[2] received. (1) We should attack the Peiping–Hankow Railway[3] when the Kuomintang launches a major offensive against us, for instance, when it attacks Northern Kiangsu or Chengteh; for the present, only make preparations, and please strive to have preparations largely completed within this month.

(2) When the attack is launched, of the four columns (excluding Chen Cheng-hsiang’s[4] column), station one on the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway[5] and use three to attack the Peiping–Hankow Railway in coordination with the Hopei-Shansi and Hopei-Chung forces; the strength will be quite sufficient. (3) If we can occupy all or the greater part of the Peiping–Hankow Railway and annihilate about half of the Kuomintang’s 3rd and 16th Armies, the enemy in Peiping and Tientsin will not dare to move recklessly, and the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway can then be consolidated; if the Peiping–Hankow Railway remains in enemy hands, the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway cannot be consolidated. (4) If we can occupy Tsinghsien and Tsanghsien[6] within this month, we can both threaten Tientsin and concentrate our forces to attack the Peiping–Hankow Railway.

(5) If we can occupy Huaijen, Yingxian, Fanshih, Taihsien, Wutai, Tinghsiang, Kuohsien,[1]

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to Nieh Jung-chen, Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military Area.

[2] A reference to Nieh Jung-chen’s telegram of July 4, 1946 to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. The telegram stated that in attacking the Peiping–Hankow Railway it would be necessary to consider consolidating the existing positions on the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway, but that mutual coordination would be rather difficult; therefore, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Area could at most dispatch three columns to coordinate with the local main forces of Hopei-Chung and Hopei-Shansi, and the entire western front (Shansi-Suiyuan) would have to be the responsibility of the troops of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Area.

[3] The Peiping–Hankow Railway, i.e., the railway from Peiping (present-day Peking) to Hankow, now a section of the Peking–Canton line.

[4] Chen Cheng-hsiang, then Commander of the 4th Column of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military Area.

[5] The Peiping–Suiyuan Railway, i.e., the railway from Peiping (present-day Peking) to Paotow in Suiyuan (now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), the present Peking–Paotow line.

[6] Tsinghsien and Tsanghsien, i.e., Tsing County and Tsang County in Hopei Province.

and Hsinhsien[1] within this month, then Fu Tso-yi[2] will certainly be intimidated and will not dare to advance eastward, and even if he does, we can cope with him by using the main force of Ho Lung and Li Ching-chuan[3] together with Chen Cheng-hsiang’s troops. (6) It will be most advantageous to attack the Peiping–Hankow Railway after we have occupied Tsinghsien and Tsanghsien and the northern section of the Tatung–Puchow Railway.

The Central Committee

Wu-yu

[1] Kuohsien, an old county name. It was abolished in 1958, with part of its territory incorporated into Ningwu County, Shansi Province, and part merged with Taihsien to form Yuanping County, Shansi Province.

[2] Fu Tso-yi, then Commander of the 12th War Zone of the Kuomintang army.

[3] Ho Lung and Li Ching-chuan, then respectively Commander and Political Commissar of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Area.