The Tactical Orientation to Be Adopted after
Issuing the “July 7th” Declaration1
(July 6, 1946)
To all bureaus and to Zhou [Enlai], Ye [Jianying], and Wu [Xiuquan]:2
The Central Committee’s “July 7th” declaration sharply criticizes the
American and Chinese reactionaries and calls upon our compatriots to rise up and
save the nation; it is enough to rouse the people’s will and place the reactionaries
in a difficult position so that they will be isolated from the people. At the same
time, however, the declaration points out that contacts with American democratic personages and with advocates for the convening of a political consultative
conference that includes all parties and groups in China are to be strengthened,
extending a welcome to any and all who support such a conference, no matter
who they are. Therefore, all areas in relation to the Beiping Office [for Military
Mediation] and all teams should continue to follow the previous directive to treat
the Guomindang and American representatives with respect and to take pains to
win over all American personnel.3 As for Marshall,4 he should not publicly be
said to be either good or bad, as he must still be relied upon to ameliorate the
situation in the negotiations. Regarding American troops in all areas, conflict with
them should still be avoided. As for Guomindang troops, on the other hand, it
will depend on the other side’s attitude; if they fight, we fight, and if they stop,
we stop. Regarding the negotiations, our Party has already made certain concessions, but the Guomindang is insatiably greedy and has raised many unreasonable
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 144–45, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
1.  See “The Reactionaries’ Scheme Will Ultimately Fail,” June 30, 1946, in this volume.
2.  Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying were the Chinese Communist Party’s representatives to
the Beiping Office for Military Mediation. Wu Xiuquan was chief-of-staff for the Chinese
Communist Party’s Twenty-seventh Executive Group at the Beiping Office for Military
Mediation.
3.  See “Give Proper Treatment to Guomindang and American Personnel on the Military Mediation Operational Teams,” June 22, 1946, in this volume.
4.  George Marshall in December 1945 became a special envoy of the United States to
China in an effort to mediate between the Guomindang government and the Communist
Party. He returned to the United States in August 1946 after declaring the failure of the
negotiations.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-194

demands, which must be refused. There are many difficulties facing both the
American reactionaries and the Guomindang reactionaries, and we should make a
realistic appraisal of their difficulties to utilize them in a resolute but appropriate
struggle and strive for a turn for the better in the current political situation. Some
centrist personages are bound to feel that the attitude we take in our declaration
is too harsh, and it should be explained to them: The American and Guomindang
reactionaries have made use of the people’s ugly behavior toward them and their
muddled understanding is an excuse to suppress the people and thereby derive
benefit; we should sharply expose this to isolate their ilk from the people and in
that way repel their attacks.
The Central Committee