The Fundamental Policy toward the United
States and Chiang Is Not to Compromise but
to Struggle
(July 6, 1946)
To Li [Fuchun] and Huang [Kecheng]:1
We received your telegram analyzing the current political situation.2 Many
points in your analysis are realistic and good, but the weakness lies in your inadequate appraisal of the difficult conditions confronting American imperialism and
Chiang Kaishek. At the same time, the appraisal of the advantageous conditions
of the international and domestic people’s democratic forces is also inadequate.
After the Second World War, the position in which revolutionary forces in all
countries find themselves will be much better, not worse, than it was following the
First World War. We should relent a bit in our demands and put pressure on the
Americans and Chiang Kaishek, but the fundamental policy is not to compromise
but to struggle. If our Party can make significant concessions and at the same time
struggle resolutely against their unjustified bullying and groundless demands, the
outcome will actually be better than making even more and greater concessions;
without a spirit of resolute struggle, the results will be extremely bad.
Mao Zedong
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 4, pp. 146–47, where it is reproduced
from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
1.  Li Fuchun was political commissar and Huang Kecheng was commander, respectively, of the Western Manchuria Military Region of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army.
2.  The telegram noted various conditions in China and abroad and advised compromising to achieve peace while awaiting an opportune moment to fight for ultimate victory.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-195