Strategic Plans for the Taihang and
Shandong Regions after the Overall
Situation Has Fallen Apart
 (June 22, 1946)
To Liu [Bocheng], Deng Xiaoping, and Bo Yibo, and to Chen [Yi] and Shu
[Tong]:1
Since the overall situation has fallen apart, please consider the following plans:
	 1.	 Regarding the Taihang region, with eastern Henan as the main direction of
battle, concentrate the main forces and make every possible effort to capture
Changyuan, Kaocheng,2 Minquan, Lanfeng, Fengqiu, Ninglong, Zhi county,
Qi county, Chenliu,3 Tongxu, Taikang, Tuocheng, Huaiyang, Shangqiu,
Luyi, and Xihua. The main emphasis is to wipe out the enemy army’s effective strength in field combat and watch for an opportunity to occupy Kaifeng.
	 2.	 Regarding the Shandong region, with the Xuzhou area as the main direction of battle, concentrate the main forces in Shandong to coordinate with
the northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui regions to capture Huangkou,4
Dangshan, Yucheng, Woyang, Jiagou, Fuli,5 Su county, Renqiao,6 and
Guzhen (that is, between Xuzhou and Bengbu). The main emphasis is on
engaging the enemy forces in Xuzhou in field combat and annihilating them,
and to watch for an opportunity to occupy Xuzhou.
Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 283–85, where it is
	 3.	 Regarding the Taihang region, apart from the forces in Shanxi dealing with
Yan [Xishan],7 one portion of the remainder should keep an eye on the enemy
in northern Henan and the largest main force should mobilize in the eastern
Henan region.
	 4.	 Regarding Shandong, [the forces in] eastern Shandong should deal with [the
enemy in] Qing[dao] and Wei[fang], and Bohai should deal with Ji’nan. The
remainder of the main forces in the central Shandong and southern Shandong
regions and along the coast and the main forces of the New Fourth Army
should all move southward.
	 5.	 It would be advantageous to occupy even only the major railway lines between
Kaifeng and Xuzhou and between Xuzhou and Bengbu, and approximately
half of the county towns mentioned above. Some of the county towns may
be left for the local forces to capture one by one, and there is no need for our
main forces to wage battle in each town.
	 6.	 During the period of fighting mentioned above, pay ample attention to winning over to our side the miscellaneous and puppet troops.
	 7.	 In the combat plans outlined above, the main force of our Fifth Division is
to break out of the enemy’s encirclement and move toward Henan, the task
being to pin down the enemy in Henan and coordinate with you in combat.
	 8.	 Su [Yu]’s and Tan [Zhenlin]’s8 main forces will deal with the enemy north
of the [Yangzi] River and coordinate with you in combat.
	 9.	 After victory in the battles mentioned above (not necessarily having captured Kaifeng and Xuzhou), if the situation is favorable, consider having the
main forces in the Taihang and Shandong regions cross the Huai River and
advance toward the Dabie Mountains–Anqing–Pukou line.
	10.	 The gist of this plan is to stress moving southward, which is the opposite of
Chiang Kaishek’s emphasis on moving northward; it could leave a large portion of Chiang’s troops in the north and place them in a passive position.
	11.	 This plan will ensure that the Fifth Division does not get wiped out or suffer
significant losses.
	12.	 This plan relies on the old base areas, involves moving southward step-bystep in a steady manner, and it is not risky.
	13.	 If we can gradually cross the Huai River and move southward, we will be
able to acquire manpower and material resources from the Guomindang
areas so that our old base areas will not suffer damage.
	14.	 Chiang has now extended the truce until the 30th of this month and he will
start fighting in a big way at the beginning of July. We must quickly set our
overall strategic policy to facilitate battle.
	15.	 We look forward to hearing your opinions.
The Central Committee
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party. Liu Bocheng was commander, Deng Xiaoping was political commissar,
and Bo Yibo was first deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. Chen Yi was commander of the New Fourth Army and of the
Shandong Military Region, with Shu Tong as director of its Political Department.

2.  Kaocheng county was merged with Lanfeng county in 1954 to form Lankao county
in Henan Province.

3.  Chenliu county was merged into Henan’s Kaifeng county in 1957.

4.  Huangkou township is located northwest of Xiao county, Anhui Province.

5.  Jiagou is a village located in northwestern Su county, Anhui Province. Fuli township
is in western Su county.

6.  Renqiao is a village located in northwestern Guzhen county, Anhui Province.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-179

7.  Yan Xishan was commander of the Twelfth War Zone of the Guomindang army.

8.  Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin were commander and political commissar, respectively, of
the Central China Field Army.