The Question of Whether Chengde Should
Be Defended or Abandoned Should Be
Considered
 (June 21, 1946)
To Nie [Rongzhen] and Liu [Lantao], and to Cheng [Zihua] and Xiao [Ke]:1
If the enemy concentrates three divisions at Pingquan and advances westward
and we are unable to destroy its main forces in the field, then there is a possibility
that Chengde will be taken. If this situation materializes in the future, then we
should consider the question of whether to defend Chengde or to take the initiative in abandoning it. If it is certain that we can destroy the enemy’s main forces
and fundamentally shatter its offensive, then we should defend Chengde; if success is not assured, then we should prepare to abandon Chengde. The first reason
for this is to conserve the strength of Yang [Dezhi] and Su [Zhenhua]’s2 column
and other troops and not expend their strength and to hold on to the vast area
of Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning until resolution of the land question, when our military
strength will increase, as at that time it may be possible to recover the Jin[zhou]-
Chengde railway and Chengde. The second reason is to draw Zhao [Erlu]’s3
column back toward Shanxi-Hebei and to coordinate with the forces in Taihang
and central Hebei to fight for Baofu and Shimen4 and the Zheng[ding]-Tai[yuan] railway. In considering which is the appropriate [course of action], please take
into consideration the relative strength of the enemy and of ourselves and inform
us by telegram. When considering these matters, do not inform the lower levels.
Additionally, in the case that Chengde cannot be defended, please state how this
will increase the difficulty of our situation.
The Central Committee
---
Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 281–82, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party. Nie Rongzhen was commander and political commissar and Liu Lantao
was deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.
Cheng Zihua was political commissar and Xiao Ke was commander, respectively, of the
Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region. On June 25, 1946, Mao Zedong drafted another
telegram on behalf of the Central Committee stating that if the talks were to collapse, the
Guomindang was sure to attack Chengde: “If the diehards are able to gather a superior
force and we are unable to stop them, we must be prepared to retreat from Chengde and
avoid haste when facing this matter lest we lose resources.”

2.  Yang Dezhi was commander and Su Zhenhua was political commissar, respectively,
of the First Column of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.

3.  Zhao Erlu was commander of the Hebei-Shanxi Column of the Shanxi-ChaharHebei Military Region.

4.  Baofu is the abbreviated term for Baoding prefecture, which is the city of Baoding
in Hebei. Shimen is the city of Shijiazhuang.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-177