Propaganda Must Suit Itself to the Development and Changes in the Situation[1]

(May to September 1946)

I. Temporarily suspend broadcasts of friction news

Beginning on the 23rd, temporarily stop broadcasting friction news, though a portion may still be published in the newspapers. If a commentary is to be written on Marshall’s statement, please send it to me for review.

(May 22)

II. Expose the enemy at the proper time

From now on, please publish and broadcast all news of attacks on our areas by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops wherever they occur. Chiang talks of a cease-fire but is actually fighting, and we should publish news to expose this. In today’s Reference News, items such as “Stubborn Troops Occupy Qingzhou and the Two Longshan Stations” and “Yan Xishan’s Troops in Wenshui Occupy Our Xiaoyi Township” should be supplemented, broadcast, and published in the newspapers.

[1] Items I and II are two letters from Mao Zedong to Yu Guang, acting director and editor-in-chief of the New China News Agency and Liberation Daily. Item III is a letter to Lu Dingyi.

[2] Marshall was then the special envoy of the U.S. President to China, participating in national negotiations under the pretext of “mediation” in an effort to uphold the rule of the Kuomintang reactionaries. On May 20, 1946, he issued a statement on the civil war in the Northeast.

Today’s front-page headline news about Huang Mohan and other celebrities seems to place them in Chongqing, not Shanghai. Please check whether saying they are in Shanghai is a mistake.

(June 30)

III. Stress that our army is certain to win and Chiang’s army is certain to lose

The approach to writing articles should be changed, because at present the central issue among the army and people in the Liberated Areas is no longer one of illusions about the United States and Chiang Kai-shek—the period when such illusions existed is already past. Describing to the army and people how formidable and how fierce the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are was necessary before July, but after July it is not only unnecessary but also has adverse effects. At present, the central issue in the minds of the army and people in the Liberated Areas is whether victory can be won and how to win it, a matter of great concern especially after the loss of some places. Therefore, the key point of our articles and news commentaries should not be to say how the enemy is oppressing us and how ruthless they are, but rather to explain that although the enemy has two hundred divisions, although they have U.S. aid, and although they have already occupied some places and may yet occupy some more, there are all kinds of conditions ensuring that our army is certain to win and Chiang’s army is certain to lose. Whenever we win a victory, write a editorial to encourage and affirm it; whenever an important place is lost, write a short article to explain it, saying that as long as we annihilate the enemy, it can be recovered in the future. Please consider the above policy and discuss its implementation with Qiao Mu and Guang Sheng. As for exposing the deception of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, an article can be written to expose it using the attack on Zhangjiakou as a pretext, but in conclusion the emphasis should still be on our army’s certain victory, so as not to cause discouragement. This article can serve the purpose of this project, but it must be reworked.

(September 27)

Propaganda Must Suit Itself to the Development and Changes in the Situation

A manuscript of Mao Zedong’s letter to Lu Dingyi.

The Sky over the Liberated Areas (Chinese painting)