When Holding Siping Is Impossible, Voluntarily Abandon It[1]

(May 19, 1946)

Lin, and inform Peng:

Your telegram of the 18th[2] noted. (1) Our army at Siping has held out for a month, engaging ten enemy divisions, demonstrating the high degree of tenacious and heroic spirit of the people’s army. This struggle is of historical significance. (2) If you feel that continuing to defend Siping to the death is no longer possible, you should voluntarily abandon Siping, using a portion of the forces to delay the enemy on the front while withdrawing the main force to both flanks for rest and reorganization, preparing to shift from positional warfare to mobile warfare. (3) If this policy is adopted, our army will certainly be able to shift from the current passive and disadvantageous position to an active and advantageous position, while the enemy, the further they advance, the more dispersed they become, the more difficult their grain and ammunition supplies, and their strength will inevitably weaken. (4) The railway south of Changchun should be rapidly and thoroughly destroyed.[3]

Central Committee

Chenhao

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Democratic United Army, and informing Peng Zhen, the First Political Commissar.

[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao on May 18, 1946, to the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the CPC Central Committee. The telegram stated: “Several positions east of Siping have been lost; the enemy is now fiercely attacking, and the situation is critical.”

[3] Another copy of the telegram preserved in the Central Archives contains five items, the fifth of which reads: “Which policy should ultimately be adopted shall be decided by Lin based on the circumstances.”