The Attitude of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek Toward the Northeast Issue and Our Countermeasures[1]

(May 15, 1946)

Lin, Peng:

(1) On the 13th, Marshall sought a conversation with Enlai[2]. Marshall stated: On the Northeast issue, it is no longer possible to make further representations to Chiang[3]. Unless the CCP forces withdraw from Changchun, I could propose that the government also refrain from advancing for the time being, and only have the Executive Headquarters[4] dispatch a portion of its personnel to be stationed in Changchun. At the same time, it is also necessary to properly negotiate plans for resolving the political, economic, communications, and military issues in the Northeast. The political, economic, and communications aspects would follow what was discussed in Chongqing, while on the military side, the army reorganization plan, the locations of garrisons, and the proportional strengths of both sides must be settled. If the CCP can agree to this proposal, then issues such as a nationwide ceasefire and cessation of troop movements, restoration of communications, leveling of blockhouses, army reorganization and demobilization, guarantees of freedoms, and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference must also be implemented simultaneously, etc. (2) Within the Pass, Marshall advocates maintaining peace; on this point, Marshall and Chiang are not entirely in agreement. In the Northeast, he advocates recovering Changchun; on this point, Marshall and Chiang are in agreement. However, on issues such as adjusting the political, military, and economic matters in the Northeast, Marshall is somewhat more enlightened than Chiang. (3) This is now Marshall’s second intervention to mediate. Please consider whether, from the overall military situation, continuing further would be advantageous, and whether consideration should be given to conditionally relinquishing Changchun in exchange for legal status in other areas and gaining time to reorganize and replenish the troops for future use. Awaiting your reply. (4) On the operational front,

[1] This was a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander-in-Chief of the Northeast Democratic United Army, and Peng Zhen, First Political Commissar.

[2] Enlai refers to Zhou Enlai.

[3] Chiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.

[4] The Executive Headquarters refers to the Executive Headquarters of the Peiping Military Mediation Department.

it is imperative to exert full effort to crush the New Sixth Army and firmly hold Siping. At the same time, order Xiao Hua[1] to lead the various brigades of the Southern Manchurian Military Region in active operations. On the Rehe[2] front and with Zhan Caifang’s[3] column, active operations are underway and may succeed in drawing the bulk of the 93rd Army to the Jinzhou area (one division of this army is garrisoning Suizhong, and the remaining two divisions are expected to reach Jinzhou around the end of the month). Under these circumstances, reaching a compromise with the United States and Chiang Kai-shek would be more advantageous.

The Central Committee

Chenshan

[1] Xiao Hua was then serving as Political Commissar of the Southern Manchurian Military Region of the Northeast Democratic United Army.

[2] Rehe was a former province encompassing areas of present-day northeastern Hebei Province, southwestern Liaoning Province, and southeastern Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It was abolished in 1955.

[3] Zhan Caifang was then serving as Commander of the Eastern Hebei Military District.