To the various bureaus, Comrades Zhou, Ye, Luo, Rao, and Li [1]:  On the Current Situation and Our Policy:   (1) Apart from waging large-scale warfare in Northeast China, the Kuomintang is actively preparing for a nationwide civil war. However, U.S. policy—while generally supporting Chiang Kai-shek and aiding him in the Northeast—does not yet endorse a full-scale civil war across the country. Moreover, Chiang is mindful of our military strength, international public opinion, and domestic sentiment, and thus hesitates to launch such a war immediately. Nevertheless, his preparations are exceptionally vigorous.


Our Party’s policy is to strive for a ceasefire in Northeast China and to prevent a nationwide civil war; at the very least, we should seek to postpone its outbreak.


Therefore, we should adopt the following measures:   A. We must not provoke the Kuomintang. Should the KMT “creep” forward or launch an offensive against us, we must resolutely repel it and recapture lost territory; otherwise, they will press their advantage inch by inch, and a major civil war will come all the sooner.
However, we must adhere strictly to a defensive posture and refrain from initiating attacks. When disputes arise, they should be referred to the Joint Military Commission for mediation after due struggle, so as to place ourselves in a just and advantageous position.


B. We need to reorganize and improve our work within the Executive Headquarters and among the various joint committees, and to enhance our relations with the Americans. Regardless of how biased the Americans may be toward the KMT, we should, while firmly upholding our positions, endeavor to win over the American side as long as the United States has not reverted to Hurley’s [3] policy of instigating a nationwide civil war.
Recently, relations with the Americans have deteriorated in some areas. This was indeed largely due to the Americans’ unfavorable attitude, but our own efforts to engage them were also insufficient. Henceforth, we must carefully study and intensify our work to win over the American side.


We should likewise pay attention to winning over representatives and officials of the KMT.


In summary, we must vigorously defend our legitimate rights and reject any unreasonable demands from the other side. Yet our overall principle should be to resolve disputes on a non-detrimental basis, rather than allowing them to escalate.


C. In Northeast China, we should simultaneously pursue resolute combat—every additional day that the defense of Siping holds is more advantageous—and diplomatic negotiations aimed at securing a ceasefire. Meanwhile, in Rehe [4], since the enemy continues to pour in troops to expand the civil war in the Northeast, we cannot avoid launching strikes against the Jin–Rehe Railway [5]. Once this phase subsides, we should promptly shift to a phase of adjustment.


D. Aside from intensifying operations in Northeast China and concurrently pressing ahead with rent reductions and production, all liberated areas should redouble their efforts on the three major tasks of military training, rent reduction, and production. Significant progress must be made within the next six months, as this will serve to deter a nationwide civil war.


Should the Kuomintang nonetheless insist on starting a civil war, we remain fully capable of utterly defeating them and ensuring our invincibility.


The coming six months are divided into two periods: May, June, and July constitute one period, while August, September, and October form the other. All localities are urged to concentrate first on the current three-month phase and to avoid complacency or slackness.


E. In all major cities, in addition to developing mass work, we should devote considerable effort to winning over various middle groups, including those within the Kuomintang itself.


Printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft, as edited by the Central Committee.


Notes:   [1] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.  Ye refers to Ye Jianying (1897–1986), from Meixian County, Guangdong Province, who at the time served as the Chinese Communist Party’s representative to the Joint Military Commission.  Luo refers to Luo Ruiqing, then Chief of Staff for the CCP side of the Joint Military Commission.  Rao refers to Rao Shushi, who at the time headed the CCP component of the 27th Joint Committee under the Commission.  Li refers to Li Lisan (1899–1967), from Liling, Hunan Province, serving as the CCP political advisor to the same committee.  Wu refers to Wu Xiuquan, born in 1908 in Wuchang, Hubei Province, who at the time was Chief of Staff for the CCP side of the 27th Joint Committee.


   [2] Chiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.


   [3] Hurley was a member of the U.S. Republican Party. He served as U.S. Ambassador to China from late November 1944. Due to his support for Chiang’s anti-communist policies, he faced strong opposition from the Chinese people and left office in November 1945.


   [4] Rehe refers to Rehe Province; see note [3] on page 10 of this volume.


   [5] The Jin–Rehe Railway denotes the railway line connecting Jinzhou to Chengde, now known as the Jin–Cheng Railway.