Strike at the Enemy at an Opportune Moment
During Mobile Warfare
 (May 3, 1946)
To Lin [Biao] and Peng [Zhen]:1
We received Lin’s telegram of the 29th.2 Because Chiang Kaishek has refused
to reach an armistice agreement, our army in the Northeast needs a long-term
plan. Do not storm fortified positions at the front. Aside from the number of
troops necessary for the defense of the cities, powerful reserve forces should be
held for striking at the enemy at an opportune moment during mobile warfare. In
addition to maintaining a stronghold at Siping, quickly prepare second front positions at Gongzhuling and elsewhere. The rear must guarantee an ample supply of
new recruits and ammunition and must immediately set up munitions factories to
produce its own ammunition, land mines, and any weapons it needs. All institutions at the rear should go all-out to serve the front. In sum, everything should be
for the sake of victory at the front.
The Central Committee
The source of our document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 198–99, where it is
1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin Biao and Peng Zhen were commander-in-chief and first political commissar, respectively, of the Northeast Democratic Allied Army.
2.  The telegram from Lin Biao stated that the recent lack of moonlight had made it
inconvenient to fight at night and the enemy forces had moved close to form positions. This
made it unlikely that the New First Army would be annihilated or defeated within ten days.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719511-132

reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.